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THEOLOGY AND THE SEMINARY¹

THIS year we begin at the beginning. The four-year period of the dogma course starts this year. The occasion calls for some preliminary remarks about theology. I do not mean that careful analysis of the nature and functions of theology which will occupy us in our first treatise, called *Introduction to Theology*; I mean something of a more personal and concrete character. What is wanted at the outset is a brief glance at theology and its relevance for the priest and the student for the priesthood. Why study theology in the seminary? Is it worth putting oneself out in order to study it well? What is the connexion between it and the apostolic ideals and hopes of the seminarist? In other words, the sort of treatment the *Readers Digest* would entitle *Theology and You*.

What is the purpose of this course of dogmatic theology? What is my aim in lecturing to you? Simply this, to make you apostles. Is the answer unexpected? Surely, it may be thought, what the lectures aim at is the imparting of theological knowledge, the giving of that information and book-learning which the Church insists upon for her priests. Obviously such a purpose is included, but it is inadequate, seriously inadequate, to see the course merely in that way. It is not a question of injustice to the ideals of the lecturer; injustice is done to theology itself. To repeat, then: the purpose of this course is to make you apostles, to form you as bearers of God's Word.

It is not the function of the seminary to form learned theologians, men capable of theological research. Its concern is with the pastoral ministry; the aim is not academic but apostolic. Certainly, learned theologian and apostle are not incompatible ideas, and the work of the apostolate sorely needs at the moment all the theological learning that is available. It must

¹ This is the substance of a lecture given at St Edmund's College at the beginning of the scholastic year. The recent correspondence about completing the dogma course (April, 1957, pp. 255-6; May 1957, 318-19) leads me to think that it may be of more general interest. Besides, seminarists, too, read THE CLERGY REVIEW.

also be added that theology can no more be separated, in any degree of its development, from the apostolate than it can be separated from the faith. The fact, however, must be recognized that the average seminary student has not the ability to become a specialist in theology, and his needs must be served by a primary and general course of theology. Now in the general teaching of theology, as distinct from the research and special studies engaged in at university level, the apostolic character of theology, together with its religious value for the student, stands out, or should stand out, with unmistakable clarity. This first and general teaching of theology, if true to itself, will have a close and evident connexion with the mission of the Church to proclaim and make known to men the Good News of Christ.

Very often students seriously underestimate the value of theology because they do not realize the intimate relationship between theology and the apostolate, and, indeed, between theology and their spiritual life. To seek from the dogma course merely the acquisition of the basic professional knowledge is to miss all that makes theology live, and to miss too that which will make one's future preaching and instruction a rich and fruitful presentation of God's Word. No, not the acquisition of information—that does not express our aim; the matter must be put instead in this way: the purpose of the theology course is to give students an understanding and awareness of revealed truth such that they will want and be able to impart it by teaching to others. To do this is unquestionably something that is at the heart of the training of an apostle. The task is nothing less than that: to impart that developed grasp and loving awareness of the Christian message of salvation that will impel the future priest to go out and tell it to men and make him able to do so. This should be the effect of theology itself, properly taught and properly studied; in this role, theology can be assisted but never replaced by pious exhortations.

"An understanding and awareness of revealed truth"—the word that comes at once to mind is "vision"; but we must remember that revelation unveils for us a reality that remains unseen. Nevertheless, the word "vision" expresses well the quality, the force and integrity, of that grasp of revealed reality that is required. The phrase "theological knowledge" is

misleading here. Theological knowledge may be but a mass of unconnected information about Christian teaching. The mind may be cluttered up with historical details and abstract notions and technical terms; it may be loaded with the erudition of the centuries and trained to manipulate with logical skill the many concepts; but with all that there may be no real possession of the revealed truths and no deep awareness of the shape of revealed reality. Knowledge worthy of the name is something else. There must be the vision of the whole. The structure of the divine message must stand out clearly; its lines should be clear-cut and not obscured. The central truths must be seen as central, and all the rest placed in harmonious relationship to them. The individual truths must be possessed as living truths; they must be entered into and assimilated—indeed it is rather they themselves that should possess the mind. Theology, however scientific, remains a work of faith; without faith there is no theology. It does not study God's truth with indifference but with commitment, and that commitment should animate with charity all the intellectual labours of the student. His scrutiny of God's Word in theology should form a unity with his approach to God and with his aspirations towards the priestly calling. If Catholic preachers and teachers have done their work well, the seminarist will already have a vital and balanced possession of revealed truth. Yet it may be through the dogma course that there is first gained that synthetic grasp of the Christian message which gives order and harmony to the mind's knowledge of Christian doctrine. But in any case, the lectures in theology must deepen and strengthen, widen and enrich the vision of the whole and the understanding and awareness of each individual truth. It would be lamentable if the study of theology should obscure that vision or blunt that awareness by multitudinous details and unassimilated information; or if the believing mind's equilibrium and the force of its faith be lost by the disproportionate treatment of the professor's pet themes at the expense of other truths. The seminary course must be an integral, ordered and living presentation of revealed truth. The scientific solidity of the treatment does not mean that erudition can run riot and that side-issues can be allowed to prevent the imparting of an ordered and finished synthesis; nor does it imply that God's

message of salvation must be viewed as a series of remote abstractions.

The understanding and awareness of revealed truth gained by theology must be such that the students will want and be able to impart it by teaching to others. The desire to communicate truth comes from its possession. "The very essence," wrote Mr Sheed, "of being possessed by any truth at all is a desire to tell it. To be possessed by a truth and not to long to communicate it would be impossible. The mark of the teacher who is possessed by truth is an almost anguished desire to convey to others what is so rich a treasure to her."¹ If a student studying the great Christian truths does not end by saying to himself that others must be told about them; if he does not feel the desire to go out and make them known to men; if he does not experience anguish that so many Catholics are unaware of these saving truths and so many unbelievers ignorant of them: if this is so, then there is beyond question something wrong with the teaching or with his study. No amount of earnest exhortation to the apostolate can replace theology in giving this lasting impetus to proclaim the Christian message. Such exhortation will remain superficial and its effect will soon fade. The source of the enduring and inescapable longing to bring men to the divine truths is the possession of them by oneself.

But am I not claiming too much for theology? An unlettered man can so possess Christian truth that he longs to communicate it to others. He can lead other men to embrace the faith by the testimony he bears to it. Is such a man to be denied a share in the apostolate? Certainly not. The most simple believer can act as God's witness and thus communicate his faith. The student, however, cannot be treated as a simple and unlettered man, for the very good reason that he is not a simple and unlettered man. He is subjected to a course of theology; for four years he studies the Christian message. If this intellectual contact with revealed truth does not impel him to go forth and make it known to others, it will instead prove a hindrance to his spiritual development. Yes, it will tend to deaden his faith and damp his apostolic zeal; it will produce a spiritual *malaise* that will call for remedy. The only cure will be to study once

¹ *Are We Really Teaching Religion?* (London, 1953), p. 21.

more revealed truth at the level of his mental development and make those barren notions and arid theses that are clogging the mind and preventing fruitful activity become what they should be: vehicles of living truth. (I have assumed that the course has left some impression on the mind and has not left this entirely unaffected.)

Again, while an unlettered man may act as a witness to his faith, he cannot teach and instruct the converted in that faith. To teach another the faith requires that rational understanding of its message and that ordered grasp of its constituent truths which, beyond an elementary stage, pertain to theology. The activity of theology and the activity of bringing the Christian message to men are not the same, and they should not be confused. In preaching and in catechetical instruction the person makes known to men the saving Word of God. In doing this he is sharing in an event that is in itself a supernatural mystery. The message he proclaims and teaches is no merely human message and his words have a divine power and force. When we bear God's Word to others, we know by faith that Christ is the living author of our message and that it carries with it the power of His Spirit to move and change the hearts of men. This does not justify any carelessness in our human preparation and our attempt to adapt our teaching to our hearers; does the invisible efficacy of the sacraments justify a neglect of the visible rite, its vehicle? Theology, though resting on faith and penetrated by its influence, is a more human and less exalted activity than preaching. It is the human mind's study of the saving Word that the preacher and teacher bear in the name of Christ to men. Its laws and methods are not those of catechetics and preaching, and for that reason a diluted theological thesis does not make a doctrinal sermon. Nevertheless, the teaching activity of the Church leans heavily on theology. This is true of the preparation of a papal document, it is true of the preacher in the pulpit, and it is true to a large extent of the ordinary teacher. Certainly, at least the priest needs a solid theological formation if he is to be adequate to his task as preacher and teacher. The stress on the apostolic orientation of the seminary course implies no plea for superficiality. There is a pressing need for priests with a thorough grasp of theology. They must be able to proclaim

Christ's message well; they must be equipped to present and explain the truths of the faith to men of differing mentalities; they must not be confounded by the objections and difficulties that are raised. A long solid intellectual formation is essential for them. All the same, mental agility is not enough. There must be the right attitude to God's Word—the commitment and the desire to make it known. No intellectual ability can replace that, and with it a less able student will often become the greater preacher, the finer teacher and the better student.

What then is required of the student of theology? Here, to omit others, are four things that are necessary. First, reflexion. How often a student neglects to think! He must think in order to enter into the truths and penetrate their meaning and significance. He must grasp their inwardness. They must become his own. He must endeavour to see the problems, to feel them and weigh them. It shocks to see problems so far-reaching that they have caused untold mental anguish to men, truths so liberating that they have produced inexpressible spiritual joy, treated by the seminarist as paltry mental counters to be played with and their markings memorized. It is a sign of a mental degradation. Think, for heaven's sake, think; you are not studying a grocery list or a Bradshaw, but problems that have racked the human spirit and the staggering responding message of God's Love. Theology is not the memorizing of notes or the amassing of information; it is the reflexion of faith. It should also for that reason be at the heart of the student's spiritual development and not outside of it. Theology should transform one's piety, which should become increasingly based on the great central truths. Thought must enable these to sink deep into the mind and exert their influence. Then, second, diligence is needed. To study earnestly is not easy; it demands persevering effort. Discipline helps us to do what we want to do. It secures our deep choices from the pressure of the immediate distraction. It is regrettable that there is so little external encouragement and social support for the priest in his study of theology, but in the seminary these are there. Co-operate with that discipline and study zealously and perseveringly. A wishy-washy enthusiasm is not enough. But, third, enthusiasm is important. The enthusiastic are often naive and amusing and misguided, but at

least they have generosity of spirit. Let us avoid like the plague that deadly cynicism that can begin in the seminary and leave still-born the seminarist's apostolic ideals. Fourth, giving life to all the rest, the apostolic spirit. Let there be a burning desire to impart God's truth to others. That does not imply that we make God's truth a means. It is not a means but an end. No one has expressed this important point better than Mgr Guardini in this passage:

The deepest significance of dogma lies not in its practical applications but in its safeguarding the fullness and freedom of sacred truth. Truth, in itself, has no purpose, only meaning. It does not serve life but shines by its own light. . . . For us men of an age wholly set upon utility and expedience, of achievement and power, of intensification of living and increase of production, understanding of this point is extremely important. There is nothing at all which truth should be made to serve. It stands above all purposes, all designs. If it really holds this sublime place in a man's mind, it will construct an order in his existence from which issue right desires and acts. Truth is like light. A man does not desire it primarily in order to see his path or to enable him to work better, but just because it is light—ask a blind man what it means to be deprived of it. Truth is the light of our proper existence, the space and order in which we live. By standing above all practical aims it guarantees that they can be rightly viewed and achieved.

Much too long Christianity has been beset with practical purposes. We have moralized it, made it active, and in so doing have lost sight of its true nature. We must perceive that the truth of revelation is not given to us, primarily, that we may do something with it, but that we may adore it and live by it.¹

We do not, then, approach God's Word so that it may subserve some practical scheme in a superficially conceived apostolate. We come before it with the adoring reverence due to God the First Truth communicated to men; but it is precisely our initial possession of this Supreme Good that generates the zeal to lead others to It.

Now suppose a student convinced of all that I have said. He opens the seminary manuals and listens to the dogma lectures. A wave of disappointment passes over him. The expectation

¹ *The Faith and Modern Man* (London, 1953), pp. 152-3.

aroused has been dashed to the ground by encounter with the reality. Theology in practice, he complains, lacks the qualities that have been extolled. Such complaints from a student are rightly treated with suspicion. It is endemic among students to seek for quick results. They will not bother to peel the orange to get the fruit. The true value of any science cannot be appreciated without patiently working through the difficult period of initiation. Likewise, theology must be studied for some time before it really comes to life. Granted all this, there is some justification for the complaints. Theology is gradually emerging from a state of impoverishment. It is this impoverished theology that largely explains the decadence of preaching, and also the reaction of many priests against theology and their failure to use it to nourish their ministry and their spiritual life. A renewal of theology is with us, and a renewal implies a prior unsatisfactory state of affairs. The story is a long one, too long to relate here. Enough to point out that it is principally three great trends in the Church today that are revivifying theology and helping to remove those defects that deprive theology of its vitality and impact.

In the first place comes the movement of return to the sources of theology, the biblical and patristic revivals. The first, by far the more important, is doing immeasurable good by restoring a more biblical, more concrete, more historical and less abstract conception of the Christian message, and theology is being guided once more by a vision of the history of salvation. Further, the great biblical themes that can nourish our preaching and teaching are receiving more and more their due place in the treatises, and Christian truths are being studied as expressed in the language and imagery of God's inspired Word. Meanwhile, there is the use of a more critical exegesis. None of this means a neglect, let alone any undervaluing, of the later developments of Christian teaching, due in the Church to the abiding presence of the Holy Spirit. But the Scriptures are given to us as an inexhaustible source, and the Church is rightly turning to them to refresh and revivify the reflexion of its faith.

And then the liturgical movement has given new life to the whole field of sacramental theology; but more than that, acting concurrently with the movement of biblical theology, it has

brought back to its central position in the Christian message the mystery of Christ's Resurrection. The new appreciation of the mighty saving event of the Pasch and of the lasting role of Risen Christ has given new spiritual strength and joy to many individual Christians; it is acting like a leaven in the dough of theology. The restoration of the Paschal Vigil will probably remain as one of the momentous spiritual events of this century, and we still await the full fruits of its repercussions on the Christian consciousness.

At the same time the catechetical movement is having a beneficial influence on theology. This movement is concerned increasingly with the content of what must be taught. The saving truths of the Christian message must be presented to the mind by the teacher. But where must the stress be laid? What are the central truths that must stand out clearly? How must the body of revealed truth be presented, so that the divine message is in no way distorted but rather its beauty and value made apparent? Theology and catechetics are closely related, since theology must study the message that the catechist teaches, and these heart-searchings among teachers are helping to give back to theology a sense of proportion that in some respects was lost by the stress of controversies both domestic and with heretics.

In some ways it is impossible to distinguish the influence of these three trends, because they interact and form but one upsurge of life in the Church of today, a fresh sign that the Holy Spirit is still with her. It has brought an immense enrichment of theology, particularly on its positive side. Less progress has been made in the difficult task of making contact with modern thought. It is not sufficient for the theologian to refute false theories; he must endeavour to see the problems that people are trying to solve and then to rethink them in the light of the Christian faith. The surge of vitality due to the return to the sources is not enough. True, a more biblical approach is in many ways more acceptable to the modern mind, but it does not answer all needs. The Christian message must still be presented in a language that the modern pagan can appreciate and his difficulties and objections must be resolutely tackled. Catholic theology is still too much of a closed world; and the theologian is not sufficiently in touch with modern thinking.

It is well to have some idea of the task and the present state of theology; it helps one to make contact with its wealth and to overcome initial difficulties. Present-day theology has its problems and its defects. The Church—and the professor under her guidance—moves slowly in these deep and vital matters. But theology has more than enough life at the present time to give the student all that he needs for a fruitful apostolate. If the study of it is wholeheartedly embraced, it will transform and enrich the spiritual life and it will make apostles, eager and able to bring to men the living Word of God.

CHARLES DAVIS

SOME REFLEXIONS ON PRESENT-DAY PHILOSOPHY¹

FOR the cleric and the clerical student philosophy will mean one or more of three things. It may indicate the speculations of professors on what appear academic and abstract themes in the remote fastnesses of universities or today the detailed analyses of propositions in technical journals; to the outsider it may appear an effort to know more and more about less and less. Or it may indicate part of the actual formation in professional studies which he has had or is having himself—the study of a general view of human experience and the world, on traditional lines, in conformity with theology. Theology is not exactly its guiding spirit but it does provide certain limits and warnings. In this sense, philosophy is the “handmaid of theology” even though she very properly claims to be a lady in her own right and to have her own proper field of speculation. Or finally, it may refer to the prevailing thought of the time. This takes us straightway into the history of philosophy, though it is

¹ (1) *British Philosophy in the Mid-Century*. A Cambridge Symposium. Edited by C. A. Mace. Pp. 396. (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1957. 30s. net.)

(2) *Contemporary British Philosophy*. Edited by H. D. Lewis. Pp. xiv + 502. (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1956. 35s. net.)

(3) *Contemporary Philosophy*. By Frederick C. Copleston, S.J. Pp. ix + 230. (Burns & Oates, London, 1956. 18s. net.)

not easy to determine where history ends and philosophizing commences. "A creative thinker," writes Professor Paton, "cannot afford to spend too much time on the study of history, which, although it is a valuable discipline, is by no means fool-proof, since we are all apt to concentrate on the past doctrines which support our present prejudices. On the other hand, it is absurd to imagine that we are thinking philosophically when we wrestle with the problems of Whitehead or Wittgenstein, but are mere historians when we struggle with those of Aristotle or Hegel." Dr Waismann, Reader in the Philosophy of Mathematics at Oxford, goes even further when he declares that "metaphysicians, like artists, are the antennae of their time: they have a flair for feeling which way the spirit is moving. . . . There is something visionary about great metaphysicians as if they had the power to see beyond the horizons of their own time."

These two quotations are taken from one of the three volumes, recently published, on which I should like to comment in this article. It contains a series of essays, some twenty in number, on *Contemporary British Philosophy*, after the pattern of an earlier series, edited by Professor Muirhead thirty years ago. The second volume, *British Philosophy at the Mid-Century*, includes further essays, similar in scope, on the occasion of a Cambridge congress. The third is a collection of papers by Fr Copleston, S.J., on *Contemporary Philosophy*, the first half of which have reference to modern British thinkers. In the text I shall speak of these volumes as A, B and C respectively. The essays, of course, vary: some are historical reviews, others personal and even autobiographical statements, while most of them express the general standpoint of the contributor or attack a special problem in which he is interested. May I add that, with the necessary exception of a few technical articles on the philosophy of science or modern logic, they make reasonably easy reading. Linguistic analysis which aims at clarity in meaning evidently encourages clarity in expression. Together, the essays provide a wide-ranging and helpful survey of present-day philosophical tendencies in Britain.

Volume B, in an essay of Professor Broad, makes us realize the debt that British thought owes in this century to Cambridge:

and this in spite of the fact that until 1896 the university had only one professorial chair of philosophy, and classical philosophy was studied in another faculty. In the early years of the century it had a strong logical tradition in John Venn (1834-1923), John Neville Keynes (1852-1950) and W. E. Johnson (1853-1931) and the psychological school of Ward and Stout (1860-1944). In John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart (1866-1925) it possessed perhaps the most remarkable of the British Neo-Hegelians with his own original and unorthodox interpretation of Hegelian thinking.¹

The Cambridge tradition of moral philosophy, represented by Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900), was continued by G. E. Moore (born 1873) with the publication of *Principia Ethica* in 1903. Professor Ewing observes (B, p. 67) that modern British philosophical ethics started with Moore, though here he was heir to a long-standing and vigorous British tradition of moral philosophy. But Moore, whose influence during the past fifty years has been very significant, "fathered" two other important developments: the switch from Idealism to the new Realism of Russell and Whitehead, and the growth of analysis as the chief task of the philosopher. Writing in 1925 in *Defence of Common Sense* he distinguished between *what* a sentence means and the *analysis* of what it means. There is no doubt—he argued—what sentences mean and no doubt in many cases that what such a sentence means is true. There is, however, no certainty as to the correct analysis of what sentences mean. Philosophy has to discover the correct analysis.

It is usually thought that logical analysis derives from Wittgenstein, who succeeded Moore at Cambridge (1889-1951), and from the Vienna Circle. Professor Broad considers that Wittgenstein's influence was "greater than that of any other Cambridge philosopher of our period except Moore and perhaps Lord Russell. Wittgenstein exercised an almost hypnotic

¹ It is worth including Professor Broad's comment on McTaggart's *magnum opus*: "For my part I would say without hesitation that the two volumes of the *Nature of Existence* . . . are a quite unique contribution to Western philosophy. The only works with which they can fittingly be compared are the *Enneads* of Plotinus, the *Ethics* of Spinoza and the *Encyclopaedia* of Hegel. Unlike those classics of speculative philosophy, they are written in a pellucid style, which eschews vagueness and metaphor, and makes reading a pleasure for those who can appreciate this difficult kind of excellence" (B, p. 45).

effect on many of his pupils, which, as he freely admitted, was not always to the good of the weaker brethren and sisters". (B, p. 55.) Fr Copleston, on the other hand, believes that the influence of the Vienna Circle was much smaller than is often imagined, for the analytic movement is rooted in the work of the classical British empiricists. Russell, for instance, had developed his theory of logical analysis and of "logical constructions" a considerable time before the Vienna Circle was even founded. (C, p. 7.) He suggests further that the neo-positivism, which is one of the less happy features of the Circle, came into British thought largely through Professor Ayer who since then has moved to a more moderate position.

In volume A Professor Paton provides a more personal account of his own and Oxford philosophy in the half-century. He traces the threads from Bradley's Idealism and Schiller's pragmatism prior to 1914 to the work of Whitehead, Alexander and Wittgenstein, the last-named of whom, in his judgement, "has had incomparably the greatest influence of the three". He adds rather critically that "it is to be hoped that some of his able disciples will make his meaning clearer to the world. For myself I am ashamed to say that, being allergic to logical atomism in any form, I took the *Tractatus* (Wittgenstein's work) at the time of its publication to be reasoning most obscurely from mistaken premisses to impossible conclusions". (A, p. 346).

However, despite this allergy to logical analysis, Professor Paton feels that philosophy is very much alive at Oxford and that the interest really is in philosophical questions and that, although it is still dominated by the linguistic movement, this is gradually becoming more mellow and flexible. Close contacts have been established with the United States but there is little association with the Continent except for the one Viennese group. Incidentally, he pays a sincere Oxford tribute to Cambridge for its striking achievements in philosophy during the past half-century. It is remarkable that three Cambridge philosophers should have received the Order of Merit in the past twelve years: Whitehead, Russell and G. E. Moore.

All thinking is conditioned, to some real extent, by the actual situation of the thinkers. The linguistic movement in Britain derives from the empirical tradition of British philosophy and

also from the great modern prestige of empirical science. It has brought with it a flight from those fundamental problems which the great classical philosophers have continually proposed from the time of Plato. In fact, metaphysics in the traditional sense has been banished and is regarded as meaningless. Philosophy has trimmed her dimensions to fit those of the empirical sciences. Her function is no longer to ask ultimate questions but to analyse propositions and to decide which of these can be accepted as "meaningful" and which dismissed as "nonsense", and the test of "meaning" has come to be verification by empirical standards. In its extreme form, this rules out all religious and ethical judgements, though more recently there is a tendency to accept ethical judgements and to allow them at least an "emotive" if not a "significant" value. This concentration on experience which denies all possibility of its transcendence and the insistence on clarity as the philosopher's supreme virtue are signs of the overwhelming importance attached to science.¹

If much of recent British thought has been influenced by the prestige of science and has become a university subject, handled by specialists with their own technique, rather than a widespread mood and outlook, one finds on the Continent, especially in Germany and France, a situation which is almost the reverse. There Existentialism, in its many forms, is dominant. Philosophy for the Existentialist is not a matter of analysing judgements or even, in the first instance, an objective study but a positive attitude to life, profoundly affected by the wars and upheavals of the century which have deepened its lines of earnestness and tragedy. Many strands may be found in it: a revolt against speculation and the hegemony of the intellect, with an abandonment of Positivism and no great interest in science; an emphasis on life and *l'élan vital*; a sharp distinction between

¹ Naturally, there are reactions against this too restricted attitude, that, for example, of Dr Waismann (A, pp. 464-5): "There is nothing like clear thinking to protect one from making discoveries. It is all very well to talk of clarity but when it becomes an obsession it is liable to nip the living thought in the bud. This, I am afraid, is one of the deplorable results of Logical Positivism, not foreseen by its founders, but only too striking in some of its followers. Look at these people, gripped by a clarity-neurosis, haunted by fear, tongue-tied, asking themselves continually: 'Oh, dear, now does this make perfectly good sense!' . . . No great discoverer has acted in accordance with the motto: 'Everything that can be said can be said clearly.'"

what is termed an "unauthentic" life in a depersonalized and dehumanized society and the genuine "authentic" life inculcated by Existentialism; a stress on personal relationships as totally different from man's relations to things and objects; the note of courage and commitment as the quality of true living. With this, on the plane of method, is usually associated Phenomenology, so that philosophy becomes an analysis—not of propositions or statements—but of personal experience. The subtle and detailed analysis of man's existence in Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* is a classic example of this method and there are few points of contact between it and most recent philosophical work in Britain.

For contact one has to go a little further back. Professor Ryle (B, p. 239), after declaring that "pre-occupation with the theory of meaning could be described as the occupational disease of twentieth-century Anglo-Saxon and Austrian philosophy" examines the influence in this particular problem of Brentano, Husserl and Meinong. Professor Findlay's *Examination of Tenses* (A, pp. 165–88) again takes us back to Husserl and Meinong. Professor Hodges who contributes to volume A an admirable chapter on Philosophical Theology has published two books on Wilhelm Dilthey. And we must remember that a number of Europeans from the Continent are teaching philosophy in Britain: among them Professors Korner, Popper, Waismann and Bondi, who all contribute to these volumes. In the main, however, it is true, as Professor Broad comments, that "hardly any British professional philosophers have been importantly affected by Existentialism". (B, p. 67.)

To pass now to ethics. Moore reacted against the obviously utilitarian doctrine in ethics and insisted that morality has to be explained in terms of itself. For him the good is an indefinable quality, something non-natural, and therefore incapable of being reduced to a naturalistic explanation. Yet in another way he re-introduced utilitarian notions for his standard of ethical judgement is the good produced by the moral act. The right act is not right in itself, for example, by conformity with human nature or some absolute principle. It is always the act which produces the greatest good or, more accurately, the greatest balance possible under the circumstances of good over evil.

But, since this cannot be known merely by induction, Moore supposed also an element of intuition, by which consequences can be seen to be good or bad in themselves. This system of *ideal utilitarianism* has been widely accepted. It is our duty, according to the theory, to perform those acts which are most conducive to the production of good, and the only ultimate criterion is found in the goodness or badness of the consequences.

This position was challenged by Professor Pritchard in an article in *Mind* (1912), with the intriguing title, *Does Moral Philosophy rest upon a mistake?* Pritchard insisted that an *ought* can proceed only from an *ought*, and that the mere fact that good results can issue from some act is no reason whatsoever why one *ought*, that is, *must*, perform it. In other words, consequences cannot confer an ethical character upon an action. He argued that we have to get back to the nature of the act itself, though he allowed that consequences need to be considered. It has been further challenged by Sir David Ross in his works, *The Right and the Good* (1930) and *Foundations of Ethics* (1939). Ross holds a doctrine of *prima facie* obligations. We have them, and they are obligations; but they bind, not absolutely, but only in the absence of stronger obligations. However, because they are obligations, their binding force comes from themselves, not the consequences of actions, and some of them at least are based upon our relations to other persons.

Some of the Logical Analysts rejected ethical judgements altogether. But, as Professor Ewing remarks (B, p. 85), few British thinkers have wholly rejected the distinction between fact and value, between the *is* and the *ought*, and carried naturalism in ethics to its logical conclusion. Few would be ready to maintain that all ethical judgements could be proved or disproved by inductively empirical generalizations. "Yet this is the conclusion which follows logically from naturalism. If 'right' just meant 'what most people approve' or 'good' just meant 'what most people desire', we could on principle settle what is right and good simply by arriving at statistics about man's feelings of approval and desires."

More recently, a number of the logical analysts have begun to say that though ethical judgements have the form of judgements, they are not really judgements at all but "emotive"

statements, like exclamations or exhortations. They express an attitude as an exclamatory phrase or an emotional appeal might do. This thesis was argued strongly by the American writer C. L. Stevenson in his *Ethics and Language*, issued in 1944. The further question can of course always be put: Why? What is the force that urges me to act in this way or to refrain from this other kind of action? We are back at the old position: how can anything other than an *ought* give rise to an *ought*?

The individual papers in these three books cover naturally a wide range of topics. In volume A, A. J. Ayer deals with Philosophical Scepticism, analysing though not accepting the sceptic's viewpoint. The sceptic is stating that our criteria are not sufficiently stringent, that we ought not to use words like "know" and "certain" in the way we do employ them. But Ayer accepts the argument against scepticism that it is only if something is genuine that anything can be fraudulent. "To suggest that all perceptions were illusory, all records unreliable, all problematic reasonings irrational, whatever their particular character, would be nonsensical." (A, p. 49.) What is interesting about scepticism is not the result which no one seriously accepts but the queries. H. B. Acton treats of the problem of political obedience and, potentially, disobedience; Donald Mackinnon of ethical intuition, a conservative paper; J. D. Mabbott of Freewill and Punishment. There are more technical chapters, for instance, on "Metaphysical and Ideographic Language" (Margaret Masterman) and "The Province of Logic" (William Kneale) along with several essays in epistemology, by Gilbert Ryle, Winston Barnes, G. E. Moore and A. J. Ayer. Karl Popper, in two essays, discusses the attitude of the scientist. He rejects Hume's belief that we grow familiar with regularity in nature on account of repetition. In his opinion, the conclusion that science proceeds from observation to theory is unjustified. Observation is always selective. Every organism has its inborn responses or reactions and is born with knowledge, which though not valid *a priori* is psychologically or genetically *a priori*. We have an instinctive expectation that we shall discover regularities. We look for them and thereby impose laws on nature. In his longer essay (A, pp. 355-88), he rejects the view that science aims at ultimate explanation in the sense that

it seeks to make clear the nature of things. Nor does he adopt the position of the instrumentalist which he characterizes somewhat roughly as "glorified plumbing, glorified gadget-making—'mechanics' . . . its professed discoveries are mere mechanical inventions, its theories are instruments—gadgets again, or perhaps super-gadgets". He looks upon scientific theories as genuine conjectures—highly informative guesses about the world which, although not verifiable, can be submitted to severe critical tests. "Theories are not our own inventions, our own ideas; they are not forced upon us, but are our self-made instruments of thought: this has been clearly seen by the idealist. But some of our theories can clash with reality; and when they do, we know that there is a reality; that there is something to remind us of the fact that our theories may be mistaken."

One of the most interesting essays in volume A asks the pertinent question: what is to become of Philosophical Theology? Or, as we would put it, what about Natural Theology? Classical philosophy until the nineteenth century took it for granted that one of its most important tasks was to prove the existence of God and say something about the divine attributes. Here there were special problems, not least the impossibility of speaking about God except in human terms and by the method of analogy. Nowadays, philosophy has been clearly differentiated from the natural sciences and even from psychology: does this mean that it must be distinguished from every kind of theology, including what is generally known as Natural Theology, the attempt to provide a rational approach to God? Is God to be no more a philosopher's concern than are matter and energy?

The answer of Professor Hodges, author of this essay, seems at first sight to be negative. Theology, he declares, grows up not out of the speculative ingenuities of metaphysicians but out of men's commerce with God (or what they believe to be this commerce), just as physics grows up out of men's commerce with the material world. The task of philosophy, therefore, is to explore the logic and epistemology of religious thinking and to comment on its principles and methods. It should, first of all, elicit the logical character of theological statements; this is no easy business since religious thinking is more intuitive and

metaphorical than scientific thought and its expression is less precise: it should investigate the types of religious discourse and see what can be done by linguistic analysis to resolve particular problems in the religious field.

Having said this he insists, however, that religious statements cannot be analysed as though they were ordinary or scientific utterances. They are so diversified. There is petition and thanksgiving. There are precepts, exhortations, aspirations, promises and vows.

All in all, then—he writes—religious language is a very curious kind of language. It says and unsays, unsays and says, oscillating perpetually between yes and no. It is a way of talking which seems to come naturally to some people, while others can see little or no value in it. Used by one who has skill and experience in the delicate balancing of yes and no, it can attract by a certain suggestiveness which characterizes it, an impression that there is always more to be said than is being said, an invitation to look beyond the statements made to a meaning which transcends them. But it could be argued that though this may be a merit in poetry, and perhaps too in liturgical and devotional language, it is not so in theology or philosophy. In these spheres it may appear baffling and repellent. We understand easily why those whose logical and linguistic ideal is clarity and distinctness are not at home with religious language. (A, pp. 224-5.)

He rejects, however, the claims of linguistic analysts to outlaw religious statements. All these have done, he points out, has been to establish tests of observation and verification which statements must satisfy if they are to be regarded as "scientific". This means merely that theology, even natural theology, is not to be identified with empirical science—a fact we always understood. Religion is based upon quasi-personal relations with God, who is conceived as intelligent and free, with a very high degree of inner unity and enjoying a perfect measure of beatitude. Natural theology goes further and asserts that God possesses these qualities in an absolute or unlimited degree. This, the author argues, is a decisive leap "beyond the recognized range of analogy; for all experience is of things in relation, conditioned by the relations in which they stand, and here we are

speaking of something not conditioned by anything at all, free from dependence or limitation". But, he concludes, what we cannot understand from actual experience we may perhaps make out from our aspirations:

For it is of the essence of aspiration that it looks beyond actual experience to something as yet not experienced, and the object of aspiration is always thought of as possessing some kind of excellence in a higher degree than we have yet experienced. Moreover, it is a common observation with a certain kind of writer that human aspirations are insatiable in terms of finite objects, and we may agree that this is actually true of some men, perhaps potentially true of all. Now, whatever else may be said about the words *infinite* and *absolute* in this theist context, it is certain that they are meant to signify the complete and lasting fulfilment of our aspirations: not merely this or that man's aspirations but those of all possible intelligent beings.

Finally, mention must be made of the attempts in some of these collected essays to establish the validity and necessity of metaphysics. Fr Copleston's chapters in volume C do this negatively by showing the limitation of logical analysis and positively by explaining the function of metaphysical thinking. Professor Ewing approaches the same problem modestly in volume A (pp. 143-64), in which he proposes his own entailment theory, according to which the principle of causation becomes a principle of sufficient reason, the principle that everything must be explained by something else unless its nature be such as to make explanation by some other existent quite impossible as in the case of God—and, he adds, perhaps of acts of free will. The theory supposes that *coherence* is the standard of truth and he adds:

There is at least much plausibility in maintaining that, provided the problem of evil cannot be seen to be on principle insoluble, the conception of the universe as the work of a perfectly wise mind with a perfectly good purpose comes nearer the coherence ideal, is therefore by the coherence criterion nearer the truth than a conception of it as the purposeless result of a conglomeration of atoms or indeed than any other conception of it that the human mind can frame. It is no doubt impossible for human beings to devise a theistic or any other meta-

physical hypothesis which will rationalize the world completely, but it is surely reasonable to do as the scientist does and accept that hypothesis which will go furthest in the direction of systematizing and explaining, even if we cannot solve all problems or give a complete and ultimate explanation. (A, pp. 162-3.)

Positivism, of course, has always looked sourly upon metaphysics. One may recall the judgement of Theodule Ribot (1839-1916):

Les métaphysiciens sont des poètes qui ont manqué leur vocation. La philosophie est oeuvre d'art plutôt que de science. Elle est complètement en dehors des faits. Son domaine, c'est l'abstrait, le général, le domaine mystérieux de l'impalpable et de l'invisible, où règnent les principes de toutes choses comme les Mères du second Faust. Elle restera comme une tentative éternelle sur l'inconnu, en quelque sorte comme un sport intellectuel. (Psychologie anglaise, pp. 19-20.)

Speaking in volume A, Fr Copleston explains the relevance of metaphysics. What it does is to make explicit something already latent in men's awareness. Men are conscious of particular causal relationships. Philosophy studies the causal relation in itself. Our knowledge is accordingly increased not by some new factual information but because the implicit is rendered explicit. An adequate analysis adds to our understanding of reality. Fr Copleston makes a distinction between first- and second-level knowledge, that is between the uncritical and as yet unexamined knowledge from day to day and knowledge after philosophic reflection. There is a metaphysic implicit in the concrete propositions of everyday language. We can, however, find no solution—on purely positivist lines—by analysing these propositions of practical experience and then interpreting them in a way which makes nonsense of what the ordinary man is in the habit of thinking and saying about himself.

In a fuller paper on the Function of Metaphysics (C, pp. 61-76), he points out that every attempt to understand empirical reality brings us up against the question of the finiteness of things. "Not *how* the world is," wrote Wittgenstein, "is the mystical, but *that* it is." If we ask the positivist for the explanation of a phenomenon he gives it to us in terms of some other phenomenon, even though strictly speaking he should avoid

expressions like "purpose" and "cause". But man has a fundamental feeling that another question has to be raised, about the cause, not of this or the other phenomenon but of phenomena *qua* phenomena, with the instinctive sense that some such explanation must be available and that it is the business of philosophy to look for it. Leibniz declared that the most important of all philosophical questions was just this, why is there something rather than nothing? Fr Copleston adds that, the more there is an existential element in philosophy, so much the more strongly does this trend towards metaphysical queries assert itself. Man finds himself within a situation, that is undefined and unarticulated, where he is conscious of his own insecurity and contingency. Against this he constructs his own small world of experience and significance but all the time he is aware that this is also against a far mightier backcloth of Being or, perhaps more exactly, within a far larger reality. He has a pre-reflective awareness of standing in relation to this ground of existence. The question of this ultimate background to finite experience and existence would never be raised were there not a primary implicit awareness of it.

Dr Waismann, to whom I have referred once or twice, and who contributes the final chapter to volume A, says that the difference between logic and philosophy (meaning metaphysics) is that logic constrains whereas philosophy leaves us free. If logicians had their way, language would become as clear and transparent as glass but also as brittle. But language in reality is plastic; it yields to the will to express, even at the cost of some obscurity.

At the heart of any philosophy worth the name—he concludes—is vision and it is from there it springs and takes its visible shape. When I say "vision", I mean it; I do not want to romanticize. What is characteristic of philosophy is the piercing of the dead crust of tradition and convention, the breaking of those fetters which bind us to inherited pre-conceptions, so as to attain a new and broader way of looking at things. It has always been felt that philosophy should reveal to us what is hidden. (I am not quite insensitive to the dangers of such a view.) Yet from Plato to Moore and Wittgenstein every great philosopher was led by a sense of vision; without it no one could have

given a new direction to human thought or opened windows into the not-yet-seen. . . . What is decisive is a new way of seeing and, what goes with it, the will to transform the whole intellectual scene. This is the real thing, and everything else is subordinate to it. (A, p. 483.)

JOHN MURRAY, S.J.

VESPERS IN CHURCH

THOSE who are concerned with the "Liturgical Movement" naturally do not confine themselves to popular participation in Holy Mass, but wish to foster the popular use also of Vespers, Compline and so forth. Dr K. McMurtrie, now an Oblate in the Benedictine abbey at Pietersburg, Transvaal, has kindly sent me Vespers of the Blessed Sacrament, arranged by him in the vernacular, and taught by him to the "Catholic Boy Singers" there. And since I fear that I may be somewhat of an "advocatus diaboli", may I first mention not only Dr McMurtrie's self-sacrificing work among the Natives of Natal whose sick were half-cured by his very visits, so trusted and beloved was he, but that he trained a magnificent choir of White South Africans, Natives and Indians, and that when I preached to a congregation chiefly (I think) of Zulus, I inserted the words: "Laudate Dominum omnes Gentes" (rather, I confess, to see what their reaction might be): they all applauded gleefully, and finished the verse "Laudate eum", etc.: so to that extent, at any rate, they knew what the words meant. None the less, he thinks (and quotes authorities to back him) that the Divine Office will never become food for the average Catholic's soul if it is sung in Latin. I listened last summer to Vespers beautifully sung at Prinknash, and relayed in the Home Service; but I could not help wondering how many would have gone on listening to the chant of psalms they did not understand. We hear that the BBC itself finds that the ordinary listener is reluctant to concentrate on a "straight talk" lasting half an hour:

hence the (to me, exasperating) breaking up of a "talk" among several speakers, or its dramatization. Be that as it may, even if Vespers be sung in Latin, we are now confronted with an optional version, which too was translated by the late Mgr Knox—a translation used by Dr McMurtrie with a few changes for the sake of the chant. But whether Vespers are to be sung in the old or new form, or in Latin or in English, they consist mainly of Psalms, and these are essentially "Old Testament" in thought and diction, and how few of our modern Catholics know anything about it. What, I wonder, do they make even of Abel, Abraham (*our* Patriarch) and Melchisedek if they follow Mass? And the *Magnificat*, which begins so beautifully and at once intelligibly, ends, as triumphant climax, with "*Abraham and his posterity for ever*"!

Now the very first Psalm in Vespers for Sunday or of our Lady and greater feasts (Ps. 109) is, for the theologian, a splendid Messianic prophecy; but, to be realist, how many of our contemporary Catholics attach any meaning even to the word "Messias"? The first verse: "The Lord said unto *my* lord" needs much explanation; our people are not prepared to transpose the literal meaning of words into the allegoric or mystical ones; "Sion" and "Jerusalem" may sound to them as referring to different places, and anyhow, in what sense does the possibility of a sceptre stretching out from Jerusalem seem desirable? Verse 4, moderately intelligible in the current text becomes, in the new one: "With Thee is the Chieftaincy in the day of Thine origin in the splendour of holiness: before the morning star, like dew, I begot Thee." The "text", we grant, is doubtful; but it would not help the Faithful to explain that to them; nor, as it stands, can "like dew" mean anything. Then comes the magnificent prophecy which detaches our Lord's priesthood from the Levitical descent; but—since what we want is that the Faithful should love and "feed upon" the liturgy—*can* we expect them to be interested in that, to say nothing of the argument in *Hebrews*, so definitely written by a Jew for Jews? And the Psalm ends by saying that the Messias will "fill ruins to the full, and crush the heads of many in the land", or, in the new version, "will pile up corpses, and smash heads far and wide in the land". But even if a priest laboriously explains the

psalm to his congregation, can he ever make such a Messias *attractive*? or convince them that His coming was realized in our Lord? To finish with this particular topic, Psalm 113 (*In exitu Israel*) is grand as literature, but we do not want to think about literature while praying; and though the Crossing of the Red Sea meant much to the Hebrews and indeed to mediaeval mystics, that event is no more fresh in our minds; and it is to Negro "spirituals" that we must look for references to Jordan: if we think at all of that strange river it will be in connexion with our Lord's Baptism: even the crossing of the Rubicon has become a metaphor which only a minority of educated persons could *explain* when they use it: the crossing of the Rhine at the end of the latest war did not become even a metaphor. As Fr Cyril Korolevsky says in his *Living Languages in Catholic Worship*, p. 110, "To understand some parts of the Psalms requires an initiation into the biblical way of writing and the poetical turns of speech proper to Hebrew", and even in the new version not everything is "crystal clear", and he alludes to the lovely psalm 41, one verse of which now reads: "My soul is depressed within me: therefore I remember Thee from the land of Jordan and Hermon, from mount Misar." Fr Korolevsky's book is important because of the high offices he holds in Rome (he celebrates "in Greek, Slavonic, Rumanian or Arabic as required"): it is a "historical survey" undertaken because of his sense of pastoral necessities. In view of these, we need an "initiation" not only into Hebrew ways of writing, but of imagining and thinking. In the 1950 *Rituale parvum ad usum dioecesium hindicae linguae*, not only all the psalms but much more are in Hindi: though since the Hindu's way of thinking is quite different from the Hebrew's, I cannot guess what even a translation of the psalms would mean to him. Even I, at school, where we were well broken in to the Psalms, used to feel that "The mountains skipped like rams, and the little hills like young sheep" was faintly comic.

Yet liturgy and dogma and the Scriptures themselves forbid us to split the Old Testament off from the New and jettison it. How "acclimatize" our people to the world of the Old? Especially as only a small percentage of them *read* the New. How many have read the lovely First Epistle of St John? The

Apocalypse is presumably given up as hopeless if it is thought of at all! Probably, even though the whole of the Old Testament is equally inspired, our use of it need not fear to be "selective". No one need be asked to attend to the genealogies, or to Ezekiel's measurements of the ideal Temple. Much of, e.g. "Judges" and even of the Books of Kings may seem bloodthirsty and repulsive—and heaven knows what the "Book of the Wars of Yahweh" (Num. xxi, 14) consisted of! Possibly one could give, to an educated audience, some idea of the value of the Minor Prophets, but probably only one or two verses would strike them and remain with them, such as "the years that the locust has eaten" (Joel ii, 25): but I have found people really amazed to hear that their expression: "*That* argument, etc., won't hold water" is inherited from the sad lines in Jeremias (ii, 13) about the people who have forsaken God, the fountain of living waters, and have hewed out cisterns—broken cisterns—that can hold no water.

I think it would not be practical, or desirable, to use sermons as a vehicle for Old Testament enlightenment, but it could be done by means of lectures. Long ago I was going to spend Holy Week in a parish where Tenebrae was regularly sung. "Of course," said the parish priest ruefully, "no one will come." I said: "Let us first try evening lectures on a selection of psalms." We had four, beginning on Palm Sunday. To the first, 15 persons came, out of politeness. At the last, there were 80, we may hope because they were interested. Somewhat similarly, I once asked a group of about twenty boys—not the youngest—to translate the *O Salutaris*. A small minority wrote: "O saving Victim", but could not say what they meant by "Victim"; most thought that "Hostia" meant "host", one who receives guests: two wrote "O salutary enemy". I asked what that *meant*: they "hadn't thought". But when adult, they were not likely to go on singing what didn't mean anything.

It is, probably, granted that non-Catholics "go to church" much more readily in the evening, and "lie in" in the morning; Catholics go in the morning because Mass is an "obligation" (we cannot judge yet what effect evening Mass will have numerically), but if we often hear it lamented that they are absent in the evening, may that not be because they are not

obliged to go, and if they do, they do not like what they get? Frankly, I do not care for various substitutes for "Vespers (or Compline), Sermon, and Benediction", and I am torn in two directions—desire to preserve the Psalms, and, to offer a spiritual food to the enormous majority of English Catholics who can make nothing of the Psalms even in the vernacular. There certainly is no chance of reviving the days when Sidonius Apollinaris said that the river-banks echoed to the bargemen singing psalms, when Paula wrote from Bethlehem that the ploughmen, the reaper, the vine-dresser lightened their work with psalm-singing, when popular feeling ran so high against the alteration of one customary word that St Jerome was defeated; even, when French Protestants, forbidden to use their own psalm-books, borrowed Catholic ones rather than not sing at all. Yet the Psalms are inspired by God, which we have no grounds for supposing even about our noblest hymns. If we cannot hope to make all the psalms palatable to the mass of our uneducated or semi-educated folk, it is surely possible to make a few psalms intelligible to and beloved by, similarly, a few; and then, helped by a good tune like Fr Gélineau's, accustom the rest of a congregation to sing and like, first, *one* psalm, previously explained, and strongly supported by the voices of the well-trained nucleus? Especially one of the Gradual Psalms? And not learnedly, but 'picturesquely'—even dramatically? This means, certainly, that the priest *can* thus explain the psalms; but may we not hope that our young theologians could be taught *one* psalm each week? They would arrive at Ordination knowing the Psalter well, and then want to impart what they possess and love; and to teach is the best way of learning yet more! We want to give as much of our great treasure to as many as possible, trusting that to them, too, it will be precious.

C. C. MARTINDALE, S.J.

NOTES ON RECENT WORK

DOGMATIC THEOLOGY

A FEW years ago Fr Bouyer, the distinguished French Oratorian, gave a series of lectures on the liturgy at Notre Dame, Indiana. These were published in the United States under the title *Liturgical Piety*, and the book was reviewed in these pages.¹ Recently it has been translated into French by Fr Roguet,² and it must be an unusual experience for an author to have a book of his put into his native tongue by another writer. The English edition of the same work is called *Life and Liturgy*.³ It was mentioned in passing in the last issue of these Notes,⁴ but the importance of the book justifies an attempt to assess its value more carefully.

The arrangement of the book, though orderly enough, is not at once apparent. It would have helped the reader had the chapters been grouped into parts with headings. If we do this four parts may be distinguished. The third part is by far the longest and contains the doctrinal substance of the book.

What is the Liturgy? That is the obvious heading for the first part, in which we may group the first three chapters; their purpose is to establish the nature and definition of the liturgy. The author begins by defining the liturgy as the "system of prayers and rites traditionally canonized by the Church as her own prayer and worship" (p. 1), and he then criticizes the false conception of liturgy, quite widespread until rejected by *Mediator Dei*, which regarded it as simply the external and official form of worship and emptied the notion of its inner and spiritual content. He traces the origins of this false conception in the Baroque period and its mentality, shows the inadequacy of later reactions to that period, and tells us of the rediscovery in recent times of what the liturgy means. The question of the meaning of the liturgy is then approached more positively. To

¹ XL, 1955, pp. 570-2.

² *La vie de la liturgie* (Paris, 1957).

³ Pp. x + 284. (Sheed & Ward. 18s.)

⁴ XLII, 1957, p. 156.

get a true and full idea of what the liturgy is, the author makes use of two themes which are eminently biblical: the People of God and the Word of God. The liturgy must be seen in relationship to God's calling together of His People, which has been the enduring purpose of the divine intervention in history. This convocation is effected by God's Word and in the assembly the Word of God comes down to us. The entire liturgy can be put under this biblical concept of the living and creative Word of God. The Scriptures that are read and sung enshrine that Word; the liturgical celebration of which this reading is a part is the Word of God given to us in the living tradition of the Church; and the sacramental and sacrificial realities are brought to us by the sacred words which form a unity with all the rest as the liturgy of God's ever efficacious Word. After examining the scriptural background of these ideas, Fr Bouyer brings them together in the following formula:

The liturgy in its unity and in its perfection is to be seen as the meeting of God's People called together in convocation by God's Word through the apostolic ministry, in order that the People, consciously united together, may hear God's Word itself in Christ, may adhere to that Word by means of the prayer and praise amid which the Word is proclaimed, and so seal by the Eucharistic sacrifice the Covenant which is accomplished by that same Word (p. 29).

This is developed in a few profound pages, and then this part is rounded off and confirmed by an exposition of Pius XII's teaching on the meaning of the liturgy given in *Mediator Dei*.

The second part, consisting of the next two chapters, may be called *The Liturgical Movement*. This is described as the response in the Church to the realization that many have lost a proper knowledge and understanding of the liturgy and consequently the right use of it. The author covers very briefly ground now familiar to most, but he gives many personal reflexions. The two most notable points are his severe criticism of Dom Guéranger and his unstinted praise of Dom Lambert Beauduin. The latter is well-deserved and will be generally supported; the former is an understandable reaction against the uncritical eulogies of the past, but it is probably excessive. At least, Dom

Gaillard in the *Revue Thomiste*¹ seems to have some cause for saying so. But whether entirely fair to Dom Guéranger or not, Fr Bouyer's strictures succeed in making clear the exigencies of a true renewal of the liturgy and the need to avoid the danger of archeologism.

Now comes the body of the book. This third part embraces the next twelve chapters and may be headed *The Theology of the Liturgy*. The opening chapter, chapter six, establishes from tradition the permanent shape of the liturgy and the subsequent chapters penetrate deeply into its theological significance. The first place is rightly given to the Mass, but the study is pursued so as to include the sacraments, sacramentals, the liturgical year, the liturgy of the saints and the divine office. The key concept in this impressive doctrinal investigation is that of Mystery, and the book is in fact an exposition of the nature of the liturgy according to the teaching of the Mystery Theology that has come to us from Dom Odo Casel and Maria-Laach. It is the fullest account of this teaching available in English.

What did Casel mean by Mystery? He did not use it here in the sense of a mysterious truth—a truth revealed by God which we cannot attain by reason and which even after our acceptance by faith remains beyond our full understanding. What is indicated by the term is not an impenetrable doctrine but a reality, a reality hidden yet communicated. Three levels of the Mystery may be distinguished. The Mystery is first of all God in Himself, the infinitely Other, the Holy and Inaccessible. The word "Mystery" expresses the idea of hidden reality outside human grasp, but with the fact of a communication implied. The Mystery then is God Himself, God in the innermost depths of His Being, the transcendent reality of the divine life, but that divine life considered as communicated and revealed to men; it is the creative and redemptive love, the divine saving plan of love as existing from all eternity in God. The Mystery is in the second place the Christian Mystery, the Mystery of Christ, the realization in the Incarnation and redemptive work of Christ of the divine plan of love. "But what, then, is the Christian Mystery? If we mean to ask what it is in its deepest reality, it is nothing less than the *transitus*, the passage from death to life,

¹ LVI, 1956, pp. 170-1.

through the Cross to the resurrection, which was once for all accomplished in Christ" (p. 87). The third level of the Mystery is the Mystery of Christ continued in the Church and made present in each of the faithful not by a mere application of merits but by a vital union with the redemptive death and glorious resurrection of Christ. It is a key axiom of this teaching that a man does not become a Christian and live the Christian life by a mere acceptance of the teaching of Christ and of the graces won by Christ but by a real share in the saving work of Christ itself. This saving work of Christ is brought to us in the liturgy, and the Mystery of Christian worship is the rendering present to us, under the veil of symbols, of the saving acts of Christ. These three levels of the Mystery are intimately connected: God who is invisible acts visibly in Christ for our salvation and under the liturgical symbols renders present this saving act in the Church. The Mystery of Christ is, therefore, made present in the sacramental order so that we can participate in it. It is the fullness of the Mystery realized in Christ that is present in the liturgy, there bringing us into itself through the sacramental economy.

We can say that the Mystery is present in its fullness in the sacramental order in so far as, through the sacraments, what Christ did comes into contact with what we are, not only to enable us to do something similar to what He did, nor, to speak exactly, to give us by means of what He did the supernatural power to do the same thing again, but rather, in everything that we must do, to enable us truly to participate in that which He did once and for all (p. 178).

Such is the inner reality present in the Christian cult. Such is the innermost nature of the Christian liturgy.

The weakest part of Casel's teaching was the role he gave to the pagan mystery religions in the formation of the liturgy. He gave them an important historical influence, seeing in them a providential preparation which offered the technique and the vocabulary that enabled the admittedly entirely original Mystery of Christian worship to be expressed in a language and in actions that the pagan converts could understand. In expounding the general teaching of Casel, Fr Bouyer criticizes this

aspect of his theory, which is historically untenable; but he points out the significance of the analogies with the pagan mysteries in showing how wonderfully God adapted the Christian Mystery to human nature.

But how is this presence of the Mystery verified in regard to the different constituent parts that make up the Christian liturgy? The place of the Mystery is the Mass, the centre of the sacramental order, the liturgy *par excellence*. Fr Bouyer, therefore, rightly gives first consideration to this. His treatment is notable for the way it brings into relief the Jewish background both of the Mass of the Catechumens and of the Eucharistic celebration itself. It is good to see set forth so admirably the antecedents of the Christian Eucharist in the Jewish tradition.

The fact that the Mystery is situated in the Mass does not exclude it from the other sacraments; it is present and active in them too. To grasp this it is necessary to remember the unity of the sacramental order and to remember that the sacraments cannot be rightly understood apart from the Eucharist. In regard to this the author makes the interesting remark:

How can we explain the fact that the Church waited for so many centuries before she became aware of the paramount importance of these seven parallel rites? The only answer to this riddle, and to others like it, is that the Church always had a perfectly clear idea of the importance of the seven sacraments, but did not define their number earlier than she did because, until the end of the Middle Ages, they had always been understood to be component parts of a single whole, centered in the Eucharist, a whole which certainly, in its primitive unity, was felt to be still more essential to the Christian life than we now think the seven distinct (and even separated) rites to be (p. 159).

Consequently, in his treatment the author takes the various sacraments both in their relationship to the Mystery and to the Eucharist where this has its fundamental presence. Order gives the ministries in the Mystery; Baptism and Confirmation form the initiation into the Mystery; Penance reintegrates the sinner into the Mystery; and the Mystery reaches out in blessings that flow from the Eucharist, the great blessing—an expansion which includes the two sacraments of Matrimony and the Anointing

of the Sick and also the sacramentals that imply a consecration of people or things.

The question of the liturgical year is more difficult. In the celebration of the liturgical year the Mystery is proclaimed and communicated. How is this so? The author stresses the unbreakable unity of the Mystery, and points out that the practice that came from Jerusalem of celebrating in historical sequence the events of Christ's life must not lead us to forget that our participation is always in the Mystery as a whole. Nevertheless there is a definite structure in the Mystery: it is a passing through death to life and this passage accomplished in Christ has to be reproduced in ourselves. This process of death and resurrection in us reproduces that of the historical life of our Lord.

In the Feasts, as in everything else in the Church, it is the Eucharist which makes actual the presence of the Mystery. But the celebration, in connection with the Eucharist, of the various Feasts, brings about a development of the Mystery in us, in all the details of the process through which it developed for Christ in the past (p. 193).

In other words, the liturgical year leads to a progressive assimilation of us in our lives to Christ by the power of the Mystery, in which we continually share. Such principles are easily applied to the Easter cycle, but since our participation in the Mystery of Christ is essentially a participation in His death and resurrection and not in His human birth, what is the meaning of the Christmas cycle? A study of this shows, the author maintains, that it is generally misunderstood. While it commemorates the Birth of Christ, its fundamental theme is the Second Coming. The purpose of Advent, Christmas and Epiphany is to arouse in us unceasingly the expectation of the Parousia, the Coming of the Lord. Far from being the beginning of the liturgical year this cycle comes at the end. It completes our celebration of the Mystery by giving that celebration its essential eschatological dimension.

In the liturgy of the saints we celebrate the Mystery of the Head as fulfilled in the Body. Fr Bouyer outlines its development and has a word of regret at the end on the neglect of the

ancient devotion to St John the Baptist, a devotion which could lead us to a renewed understanding of the Mystery.

Finally comes the perpetual praise of the Mystery, the divine office, the means whereby the Church enshrines her Eucharistic celebration in the unceasing action of her prayer. The chapter shows how the Psalter fulfils the requirements of a "prayer that springs from a full understanding of the Mystery and, in the human words of our thanksgiving, carries our answer to the Divine Word of the Mystery" (p. 230), and it emphasizes the importance of Lauds and Vespers as the morning and evening prayer of the Church.

After this truly remarkable doctrinal analysis of the liturgy, Fr Bouyer in a fourth part deals with two problems that can be put together under the title *Liturgy and Life*. The first problem concerns the liturgy and the spiritual life and involves the delicate question of the relationship between the liturgy and the non-liturgical popular devotions. The chapter devoted to it traces historically the divorce that came about between popular devotion and the liturgy. The liturgy became fossilized and ceased to nourish the spontaneous piety of the faithful; hence the growth of devotions foreign to the spirit of the liturgy. The cause of the fossilization is to be sought in the decay of that traditional Christian culture, biblical and patristic in character, so necessary for a fruitful understanding of the liturgy. What then must be our attitude to these devotions? The author regards as an enormous mistake any attempt to suppress them. He gives a generous appreciation of their historical role, and he adds:

We must not forget the fact that some of the historical causes which fostered modern devotions are still operative. Especially must we not lose sight of the fact that our own mentality is still influenced by these factors to an extent which we ourselves cannot fully measure. Let us once more repeat this truth: we cannot suppress any part of the past, either of the Church or of any individual Christian, just because we are not content with it. Whether they have tended to good or evil, experiences can never be suppressed without creating psychological disasters worse even than the worst of these experiences. Instead, they must be animated, incorporated, and finally swept into the main stream of

life, but never left aside. If we fail so to incorporate and dominate such experiences, the rejection of what was spurious will not be effective, nor will be the re-admission of what was wanting. We shall only prepare the soil for various kinds of spiritual neurosis, which will choke what we tried to foster, while the apparently rejected experience will seed itself and take root once more in the most unexpected places (pp. 249-50).

What must be done then is first to restore in ourselves the spirit of the liturgy, and the fundamental condition of this is a personal knowledge of the Bible as a whole and meditation on it. We must then reanimate our devotions with this spirit and the necessary adjustments will take place not by suppression but by a living development.¹

The second problem treated in this last part is the relationship between the liturgy and everyday life, or to put it more profoundly between the Mystery and this world. Here the author explains briefly that Christian eschatological outlook on this world the necessity of which he has defended on other occasions. The chapter in which he does this forms a fitting conclusion to the book. There is added, however, a useful appendix surveying the history of liturgical studies.

This lengthy analysis seemed necessary to give an adequate idea of the contents of this important work and to introduce a world of thought still unfamiliar to many. Some comments may now be given.

First, the practical attitude of Fr Bouyer is admirably balanced. He has a deep sense of the traditional values of the liturgy. Some will remember his contribution to the first volume of the now well-known *Lex Orandi* series at a time when many were speaking of creating a liturgy adapted to our age, a liturgy of conquest, a liturgy for the masses:

La liturgie c'est, et cela a toujours été, un donné, un *donné traditionnel* . . . c'est un de ces trésors vivants que l'Église porte en elle et avec elle pour le monde et d'abord pour elle, trésors qui sont, avec la liturgie, l'Écriture, le dogme, la morale, la spiritualité. Ou mieux encore, je le répète, c'est une source, c'est la

¹ For a theoretical examination of the distinction between the liturgy and non-liturgical devotions and of the opinions concerning this, see the recent article "The Nature and Definition of the Liturgy" by John H. Miller, C.S.C., in *Theological Studies*, 18 (1957), pp. 325-56.

source par excellence ou dogme, morale, spiritualité se retrouvent d'ailleurs avec l'Écriture, unis et vivifiés. C'est quelque chose que nous pouvons souhaiter d'enrichir, comme chaque génération chrétienne vivante enrichit la spiritualité chrétienne, la morale chrétienne, le dogme lui-même; mais c'est quelque chose qu'il faut d'abord recevoir, recevoir de l'Église comme le plus grand don qu'elle peut et veut nous faire. C'est donc quelque chose qu'il faut d'abord découvrir, puis connaître, puis comprendre, puis goûter, quelque chose qu'il méditer et qu'il faut vivre. Dire cela, c'est dire la tâche primordiale de tout mouvement liturgique pastoral, sans quoi son nom ne sera qu'un attrape-nigaud.¹

If anyone still fears that so clarion a call as this book to the renewal of the liturgy and liturgical piety implies a lack of appreciation of the sacredness and continuity of the liturgy, let him read also the profound conference given by the author in the beginnings of the *Centre de Pastorale Liturgique*.² Few can have combated so vigorously as Fr Bouyer the false utilitarian conception that regards the liturgy as ours to change just as we will. But he realizes equally clearly that the liturgy is something that we must live here and now in this age. Liturgical piety is not a nostalgia for a past age but a living the Church's life of worship in this, and the liturgy while remaining one and the same can adapt itself in the way it has done so often in the past, so as to be effectively the Christian worship of men today.

From the doctrinal point of view, the book, amazingly rich though it is, belongs to the category of the stimulating rather than to that of the satisfying. The author is a writer of great insight. He sees vividly and penetratingly a given doctrine or a given opinion and expounds it with enthusiastic vigour. He has in this way given us an exposition of the Mystery Theology which is a valuable addition to English theological writing and which provokes reflexion on every page. What he does not do is to take the aspect that he seizes, examine carefully its relationship to other aspects of the truth and integrate all together in a worked out and balanced synthesis. The central idea of the

¹ "Quelque mises au point sur le sens et le rôle de la Liturgie" in *Études de pastorale liturgique* (Paris, 1944), pp. 383-4.

² "Quelques principes historiques de l'évolution liturgique" in *La Maison-Dieu*, 10, pp. 47-85.

Mystery Theology, namely the presence of the Mystery and our sharing in it, may be reasonably regarded as a definitive enrichment of our thought on the Eucharist and the sacraments. For this reason Fr Bouyer's book may be regarded as an acceptable and helpful account of the inner nature of the liturgy from a particular standpoint. No doubt Casel's efforts to analyse the presence of the Mystery do not seem destined to last and there is still much to be done before the idea is made theologically explicit in a satisfactory way, but it remains a true and fruitful way of looking at the sacramental economy and it can help us in our reflexion on this. But it is not the only concept of value to our reflexion. In the theology of the sacraments, and of the Eucharist in particular, the contribution of this fresh approach must be brought into contact with the contribution of other more familiar approaches. All aspects of the truth must be gathered together. The many insights gained by the Christian centuries must all be considered and the various concepts and images all made to play their part in elucidating as far as is possible the great revealed truths. It is a laborious process to bring thus together many different partial views so that they control and modify each other, but it alone can produce a harmoniously ordered synthesis. Fr Bouyer does not do this; he gives us instead a brilliant essay. No one should complain of this, but it is well to recognize the limitations and one-sided character of such a work. It is a fault of his style that this fact is sometimes obscured, and a greater readiness to qualify would not have been out of place. Many have found the book very difficult. This is partly due to the fact that, although Fr Bouyer has a remarkable command of English, the exposition all the same lacks to some degree that sharp clarity of expression which would have helped readers over the unavoidable hurdles of the thought. But a stronger and more operative cause is that the book is an account of sacramental doctrine from an unfamiliar standpoint without any attempt to relate the new insight to the other and more familiar understanding of it. To some extent it is the educated but doctrinally untrained reader who will assimilate the rich thought of the book with the least trouble; he will not be continually bothered by the need to relate the ideas given to ideas already possessed. Finally, the

author's remarks on concelebration are abrupt and unsatisfactory. Made before the Pope's clarification of the question at the Assisi Congress they need to be worked over and modified in the light of this.¹

Theological thought and its dissemination owe much to books such as Fr Bouyer's; but the equilibrium of that thought is due in great measure to the steadier and less exciting work of those who write treatises for the schools. One of the best of these on the Eucharist is that of Fr Filograssi, the well-known professor at the Gregorian University, Rome. His treatise is particularly noteworthy for its pedagogical qualities, and it may be thoroughly recommended to all who want a clear, straightforward account of Eucharistic doctrine together with a theological elaboration of the highest quality. The sixth edition of this work has recently been published.² This edition follows closely the previous one. The author still keeps the old order of treatment, namely, the real presence, the sacrifice and the sacrament. It is not the best division, since there is a danger of its obscuring the unity of the Eucharist and the dynamic purpose of the real presence. From this point of view, the following division seems preferable: the sign or *sacramentum tantum*; the first effect of the sign, the presence of Christ and his sacrifice, or *res et sacramentum*; and the second effect of the sign, the spiritual fruits or *res tantum*. As in the fifth edition the treatise on the Eucharist is preceded by a sixty-three page section on tradition. This is an excellent piece of work, which examines the notion of tradition and discusses the related problems, but it would have been better to have kept it as a separate publication than to have inserted it somewhat arbitrarily into this book—or is this merely a librarian's irritation at something being out of place? Some improvements in arrangement have been made in the section on the Eucharistic sacrifice but the content remains the same. The most important change in this new edition consists in two additions: there is the amplification of the scholium on the meaning of the word "substance" in Eucharistic doctrine

¹ For an account of the discussions on this point and the significance of the Pope's intervention, see "The Pope and Private Masses", by Mgr H. Francis Davis in *THE CLERGY REVIEW*, XLII, 1957, pp. 2-14.

² *De Sanctissima Eucharistia Quaestiones Dogmaticae Selectae*. Pp. 483. (Romae apud Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae. No price given.)

when regard is had to modern scientific theories; and an appendix is devoted to the Pope's statement on the real presence at the Assisi Congress. A consideration of these additions involves a discussion of other recent writing on the Eucharist and of the debates to which it has given rise. A return will be made to these points in a future issue of these Notes.

CHARLES DAVIS

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

CHRISTMAS MIDNIGHT MASS IN A MASS-CENTRE

In a scattered parish, in addition to the parish church, there is a church hall serving an outlying district, three miles away, where the Blessed Sacrament is not reserved, but Mass is provided on Sundays and feasts of precept. Can the Christmas midnight Mass be said in both places? Would the same apply to a mere Mass-centre, e.g. a large room where Mass is habitually said on Sundays? (G.)

REPLY

Canon 821, §2: "In nocte Nativitatis Domini inchoari media nocte potest sola Missa conventualis vel paroeccialis, non autem alia sine apostolico indulto."

None of the manualists whom we have consulted deals with this precise question, and the only writer whose treatment of it we have encountered in a periodical returns a negative answer.¹ At least, he decides that an apostolic indult is required for an overflow midnight Mass in a church crypt, parochial hall, or other "decent place" (canon 822, §4); and though an overflow Mass is not quite the same thing as an extra Mass provided in a separate district, his argument would seem to apply equally to

¹ J. F. Dwyer, in *The American Ecclesiastical Review*, December 1941, p. 482.

the latter. He claims that the term "*missa paroecialis*", used in canon 821, §2, has only two senses: either the *Missa pro populo*, or the principal Mass on a day of obligation in a parish church; and he concludes that since, even in this latter sense, it signifies a single Mass, he cannot accept the opinion of those (no names given) who hold that more than one such Mass may be celebrated at Christmas midnight without an apostolic indult.

We venture to question this narrow interpretation of "*missa paroecialis*" and the conclusion drawn from it. Vermeersch-Creusen, observing that the term occurs nowhere else in the Code, take it to mean "any (*omnem*) Mass celebrated on a feast day for the greater convenience of the people".¹ A Mass provided in an outlying district of a parish, whether in a chapel-of-ease or in a Mass-centre, would seem to satisfy this definition and therefore fall within the meaning of the law. Dr Conway of Maynooth would apparently agree, because, dealing with the analogous case of a parish with two churches, one principal and one subsidiary, he does not regard it as necessary to the notion of a "*missa paroecialis*" that it be celebrated in the principal church. On the other hand, by declaring that "midnight Mass could be celebrated in either of the churches described", he implies that, in his opinion, midnight Mass may not be celebrated in both the churches.²

This is certainly not clear from the mere text of the canon, nor, as far as we can see, does it follow necessarily from the source documents cited in Gasparri's footnotes to the Code. The canon does not say "only one Mass in a parish", but "only parochial Mass". It is true that the manualists commonly paraphrase "*sola Missa paroecialis*" as "*una Missa*", or "*unica Missa*", but the point they are primarily making is that, whereas religious houses may have all three Christmas Masses consecutively from midnight, parishes may have only the midnight Mass; they do not appear to be dealing directly with the question whether this first Mass may be celebrated in more than one place in the same parish. Thus Cappello writes: "*Una Missa celebrari potest, et quidem conventualis vel paroecialis*

¹ *Epitome Iuris Canonici*, II, n. 97. The Congregation of Rites, D.A. 3623, defines it in another context as the *Missa pro populo*, but it clearly cannot have that meaning here. Cf. THE CLERGY REVIEW, February 1936, p. 156.

² *The Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, April 1945, p. 271.

tantum, non vero omnes tres";¹ and likewise Claeys Bouuaert-Simenon: "Haec Missa, sc. prima e tribus, inchoari potest media nocte, non antea, in omnibus ecclesiis paroecialibus."² They clearly exclude more than one midnight Mass in any given parish church, but none of those consulted expressly says that the parochial midnight Mass may be said in only one place in any given parish. Even Noldin's "unam Missam parochialem", which sounds explicit enough, is counterbalanced by the words "nullam vero *privatam* sine apostolico indulto",³ which indicate that his primary concern is to exclude other non-parochial Masses.

We admit that our argument is largely a plea of "not proven" against the contrary and that we are unable to quote positive support for it. This, however, is not altogether surprising, since the manualists write mainly from countries where there is more church space than church-going parishioners to occupy it, and every sizable village has its parish church. They seldom envisage our English scene, in which it is common for a town parish to cover a number of outlying villages which have to be served by chapels-of-ease, or Mass-centres. In such conditions, the common law, tailored for a different figure, does not sit easily, and one can be forgiven for stretching it occasionally to shape, in preference to living by indult.

Indeed, if we consider the question as a whole, we must admit that it cannot be solved within the strict limits of the common law, but only by invoking the legitimate contrary customs which we have established in this country by immemorial practice dating back to penal times. It raises the question of Mass-centres. Now, by the common law of canon 822, §4, local Ordinaries cannot authorize the *habitual* celebration of Mass outside of blessed churches and oratories, but only "in aliquo extraordinario casu et per modum actus". In practice, nevertheless, our bishops have never hesitated to allow Mass to be celebrated habitually, on Sundays and holy days, in unblest halls, schools, farm-houses, etc., wherever and whenever the spiritual good of the faithful has seemed to require it. They have been and are fully justified in doing so by the legitimate

¹ *De Sacramentis*, I, n. 792.

² *Manuale Iuris Canonici*, II, n. 91. Cf. also Coronata, *De Sacramentis*, I, n. 235.

³ *Summa T.M.*, III, n. 205.

contrary custom which began in the sixteenth century, when all our parish churches were taken from us, and has been maintained through four hundred years of missionary endeavour. Never throughout that time having had enough church space to accommodate the faithful, we have had to take the Mass to them in makeshift Mass-centres, and shall probably have to continue to do so for many years yet to come.¹ A Mass said in such a centre is a "parochial Mass", in the sense which the term has acquired in this country; indeed, for the particular area which it serves, it is *the* parochial Mass. If, therefore, our bishops are justified in authorizing the habitual celebration of parochial Mass in these centres, we consider that any such centre can lawfully have the Christmas midnight Mass, at least if it habitually serves as the equivalent of the parish church for the area in which it is situated. Legitimate contrary customs are as much part of the Church's canonical provision for special circumstances as are apostolic indults. There is no need to resort to the latter when the former are in possession.

MIXED MARRIAGE DISPENSATION—"HOPE OF CONVERSION"

In connexion with the question recently discussed in *THE CLERGY REVIEW*, September 1957, p. 547, it has been suggested that if the moral character of the parties to a mixed marriage is such as to preclude any real danger of their marrying outside the Church, or any other *causa inhonesta*, it will be such as to warrant a prudent hope of the conversion of the non-Catholic party; and therefore that one or other of these reasons will always be available for a dispensation from mixed religion. The question is: (1) Can "hope of conversion", which is mentioned in the *Dataria* list of causes, be a sufficient cause in itself? (2) Upon what foundation should the hope of conversion be based? Is it enough that the priest sincerely believes in the existence of a real hope? (3) How can the use of this cause be reconciled with the apparent mind of the Church, which is to allow mixed marriages only as the lesser of two evils? (Hopeful.)

¹ The Irish have a similar custom of "station Masses".

REPLY

Until the *Dataria* was reformed by Leo XIII, in 1901, it was the department of the papal curia responsible for receiving petitions for papal favours, examining whether they could opportunely be granted, and appending the signature and date to granted requests. In the *Acta Sanctae Sedis* of that same year,¹ there appeared an undated document emanating "ex S. Dataria Apostolica" which was headed: "*Causae Canonicae Ordinariae Matrimonialium dispensationum sufficientes sive coniunctae plures, sive solae et aliarum normae.*" It contained a list of twenty-eight such causes, and n. 17 was: "*Propter spem conversionis compartis ad catholicam religionem.*"

Commenting on these causes, Cardinal Gasparri observes: "*Dicuntur canonicae, quia ex stylo et consuetudine probata Curiae admitti generaliter solent pro dispensationibus; ordinariae, quia hae plerumque allegantur et admittuntur, sed alias non excludunt, quae iudicio dispensantis sint sufficientes.*"² He goes on to remark, however, that although all the causes enumerated in this list are canonical, not all of them suffice for all impediments; and that generally, before a cause can be admitted as reasonable and approved, all the circumstances of the case must be taken into account and it must be found to be "*secundum aequitatem licita, secundum honestatem conveniens, secundum utilitatem expediens.*"³ When therefore he eventually comes to consider what are the "*iustae ac graves causae*" required by canon 1061 for a dispensation from mixed religion, he avoids any generalization and limits himself to the statement that an absolutely certain reply cannot be given in the abstract, because the circumstances of each case must always be considered. In other words, one cannot say of any cause, taken in the abstract, that it is sufficient in itself for a dispensation of this kind.

Where angels fear to tread, it would be foolish to rush in with an imprudent generalization about the sufficiency of *spes conversionis compartis*. As we have seen, it is both a canonical and

¹ Vol. XXXIV, p. 34.

² *De Matrimonio*, I, n. 297.

³ *Op. cit.*, n. 298.

an ordinary cause, i.e. one that is commonly pleaded by petitioners and commonly admitted by the *stylus* and approved custom of the Roman curia; moreover, it is numbered among those which can be sufficient, either in conjunction with others or alone. As to whether it will actually suffice alone in any given case, that is for the dispensing authority to decide in the light of the particular circumstances of the case; but we know of no positive decree or intrinsic reason which prevents it from being accepted as sufficient in itself, at least when the circumstances of the case indicate that the hope of conversion is very well founded. No convincing argument to the contrary can be drawn from the fact that it does not figure in the earlier and more frequently quoted list issued by Propaganda, 9 May 1877, because that list did not purport to be an exclusive list of self-sufficient causes, nor has it since been declared to be such. It is agreed that a graver cause is required for a dispensation from mixed religion than would suffice in the case of many other impediments, but there is this to be noted about *spes conversionis compartis*: in proportion as the likelihood of conversion increases, the evil which the impediment seeks to prevent, and to which the cause of dispensation must be proportionate, decreases in gravity.

(2) In principle, the mere belief of the priest concerned that there is a real hope of conversion is not enough, however sincerely it be held. The law allows a cause to be accepted in case of doubt as to its sufficiency,¹ but it is presumed that reasonable efforts have first been made to dispel the doubt and achieve moral certainty. *Spes conversionis* must be assumed to mean a positively probable hope, and a hope cannot be called positively probable unless it is based on objective evidence. Normally, therefore, it is not sufficient that the non-Catholic party is a conscientious person of good will, and that the priest is optimistic in regard to the eventual effect of contact with the Catholic faith; the party must have given some positive indication of benevolence towards the Catholic faith, and the circumstances of the case must be such as to be likely to foster this disposition and bring it eventually to fruition.

¹ Canon 84, §2. Some authors would extend this to cover doubt as to the existence of the cause; cf. THE CLERGY REVIEW, December 1956, p. 745.

(3) The admission of this cause as canonical can be reconciled with the mind of the Church (which allows mixed marriages only as the lesser of two evils), precisely because, if the hope of conversion is fulfilled, the very reason for the prohibition will disappear, and the marriage, far from being a lesser evil, will be a positive good.

As for the suggestion, quoted by our correspondent, that whenever there is no danger of civil marriage, there must be said to be a reasonable hope of conversion, it strikes us as being far too rough and ready a rule of thumb to be more than a preliminary pointer to the truth. The absence of danger of civil marriage merely proves the loyalty of the Catholic party to the discipline of the Church. Of itself, it provides no clue whatever to the religious dispositions of the non-Catholic, or to the likelihood of his or her eventual conversion to the Catholic faith. The two things are, at best, only accidentally connected, in that a loyal Catholic who can be relied upon not to marry outside the Church is more likely to strive for the conversion of his or her non-Catholic partner.

CELEBRATION OF MASS IN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES

What is the minimum necessary for the celebration of Mass in exceptional circumstances, e.g. in times of persecution, or in concentration camps? (R. H. L.)

REPLY

Canon 817: "*Nefas est, urgente etiam extrema necessitate, alteram materiam sine altera, aut etiam utramque, extra Missae celebrationem, consecrare.*"

Canon 818: "*Reprobata quavis contraria consuetudine, sacerdos celebrans accurate ac devote servet rubricas suorum ritualium librorum. . .*"

This is a question to which no private person can confidently give a definite answer. It must be remembered that no one has

an absolute right to receive Holy Communion, and, *a fortiori*, no priest has an absolute right to celebrate Mass. One's right is conditional; it extends only so far as the Church, acting as divinely appointed administrator of the sacraments and interpreter of the divine law, permits. From which it follows that she can attach conditions to her permission which bind under all circumstances, *salvo iure divino*, whatever hardships they may involve in individual cases. But though she has specified in her rubrical law the conditions under which she normally permits the celebration of Mass, she has not declared by a general ruling such as she alone can issue, which of these bind absolutely and admit of no excuse of grave inconvenience or appeal to *epikeia*. Nor does the common teaching of approved authors provide a clear guide to her mind in this matter. Many of them instance particular rubrics which they consider are not meant to be binding in exceptional circumstances, but we know of no one who attempts to define the irreducible minimum of her absolute requirements. We can therefore only hazard a guess as to what that minimum would be, if, as seems unlikely, the Holy See were to define it authentically.

It seems clear enough that the necessary minimum must include at least everything that is required to ensure the morally certain validity and integrity of the sacrifice. The bread therefore must certainly be wheaten bread and the wine natural wine, made from the grapes of the vine and not corrupted.¹ Since the admixture of one part of water to two parts of wine would render the matter doubtfully valid,² the amount of water added (and there can be no excuse for not adding it when it is available) must not exceed a quarter of the whole; and since the consecrated species of wine must be drunk, it must be sufficient in quantity to be capable of being swallowed before it has become dissolved in the saliva of the mouth. The words of consecration must be said in such manner as to be audible at least to the priest himself, because otherwise the sensible sign necessary to the validity of the sacrament might be lacking. Finally, a complete Mass must be said, because canon 817 forbids the species to be consecrated "outside the celebration of

¹ Canon 815.

² Coronata, *De Sacramentis*, I, n. 211, r.

Mass", even in a case of extreme necessity; and though the term Mass, in the context of this canon, would not seem to include all the rites and ceremonies normally required, it must certainly be taken to cover everything from the Offertory to the Communion inclusively.

As for the rest of the rubrical requirements, it is impossible to draw a hard and fast line applicable to all cases of grave necessity, because the minimum of observance on which the Church insists must inevitably vary with the varying degrees of necessity to which the individual priest, harassed by persecution or imprisonment, happens to be subject. Over and above the requirements of the validity and integrity of the sacrifice, there is clearly a certain minimum of regard for the proprieties, as determined by the rubrics, which is demanded, under any imaginable conditions, by the very sacredness of the act. The records of the missionary priests in this country, under the persecution of the Tudors and Stuarts, show that they endured considerable inconvenience and even grave danger in order to comply with every rubrical requirement except that of the appropriate place for Mass. They had their lightweight vestments, diminutive altar stones, rudimentary chalices and pocket missals, even though possession of these things could lead to imprisonment and death. No doubt similar efforts are made today in countries where the celebration of Mass is treated as a penal offence; but we also hear of Mass being celebrated, especially in concentration camps, with none of the normal furnishings or formalities. There are tales, for example, of priests saying Mass lying prone in their bunks, without vestments, altar stone, missal or candles, and with only an ordinary cup for a chalice. Are such practices *objectively* justified, even when it is a question of obeying the divine law of Viaticum, and, *a fortiori*, when it is a question of securing the sustaining graces of Mass and Communion? All we can say is that the common reaction of the faithful seems to have been one of admiration rather than *admiratio*, and that people are more apt to be edified by such devotion to the Mass than to be shocked by such disregard of the formalities.

For some of these omissions it is possible to find positive justification in the teaching of approved authors. Thus Cappello

reports that the faculty of celebrating without sacred vestments has been granted to priests in Russia, owing to the special circumstances.¹ He considers that lighted candles can be dispensed with for any grave case²; and since he holds that, by leave of the Ordinary, Mass can be said without an altar stone in a case of very grave necessity,³ he would doubtless allow such leave to be presumed in similar circumstances, when it cannot be sought. But no general rule can be derived from collected opinions of this kind. Every concrete case requires an individual judgement; and, saving a contrary decision of the Holy See, we feel that this can best be left to the conscience of the persecuted or imprisoned priest.

L. L. McR.

PRIVATE BAPTISM OF A CONVERT

In the form for the reception of a convert in our *Ordo Administrandi* (chapter 4) the rubrics speak of "private" and "public" baptism. What is meant, in this context, by these terms? (W. C.).

REPLY

The Code of Canon Law (can. 737, §1) defines "private baptism", or "non-solemn baptism", as baptism administered without all the "rites and ceremonies prescribed in the ritual books". It does not use the term "public baptism"; it uses "solemn baptism". But the Instruction of the Holy Office of 1859 to the bishops of England, from which the form of reconciliation of a convert given in our *Ordo Administrandi* is derived, does use the word "public".

The general law of the Church is that baptism is, normally, to be conferred solemnly (*C.ŷ.C.*, 755, §1). Only in the case of danger of death may baptism be "private" (*C.ŷ.C.*, 759, §2),

¹ *De Sacramentis*, I, n. 759.

² *Ibid.*, n. 728.

³ *Ibid.*, n. 710.

with one exception, i.e. the conditional baptism of an adult heretic. In this case by common law the local Ordinary may allow the baptism to be "private"; but for us "private" baptism is not only allowed in this case, but is obligatory, because ordered by the First Synod of Westminster (decree xvi, 8).

This decree prescribed that the conditional baptism of a heretic is to be carried out "not publicly but entirely privately, with lustral water, and without ceremonies". The *Ordo* says (§1b) the baptism is conferred "secretly" in this case—as a decision of the Holy Office of 1879 had ordained—and evidently this *secreto* is equivalent to "omnino privatim" of the Synod. This ruling is reproduced in the new *Small Ritual* (p. 63), edited by the Archbishop of Birmingham (1956).

Evidently then the "private baptism" of our form of the reconciliation of a convert is private in both the ordinary meaning of the word, i.e. carried out not publicly (it is done in the sacristy but in the presence of two witnesses, as *C.7.C.*, 742, §1 requires), and in the canonical meaning, i.e. the sacrament is administered without all the "rites and ceremonies of the ritual books". "Public" in the form evidently has a twofold meaning also, i.e. that the baptism is carried out with full ceremonial, and that this is done publicly—normally, in the church, in the sight of all—for the reception of a new member into the Church is a matter that concerns the entire parish in which he lives. For the baptism when public—i.e. the absolute baptism of an adult—the full form of adult baptism *may* be used, but, normally, the Ordinary—whose concern the baptism of an adult is (*C.7.C.*, 744)—will permit the shorter form of the baptism of children to be used. This was a privilege first granted to England by the 1859 Instruction of the Holy Office, but is now embodied in *C.7.C.*, which "for a grave and reasonable cause" authorizes the local Ordinary to allow this. The Holy Office Instruction (§1a) seems to assume that this privilege will always be used; and the Ordinary may prescribe its use as was done at the Middlesbrough Synod of 1923 (Statutes, n. 99).

J. B. O'C.

ROMAN DOCUMENTS
 THE SHAPE OF SACRED VESTMENTS
 SACRA CONGREGATIO RITUUM

DECLARATIO

CIRCA DUBIUM DE FORMA PARAMENTORUM (*A.A.S.*, 1957, XLIX, p. 762).

Quum plurimi sacrorum Antistites alique ecclesiastici viri a Sancta Sede crebro petierint, iuxta Responsum die 9 Decembris 1925 datum (cfr. *A.A.S.*, v. XVIII a. 1926, p. 58), licentiam conficiendi et adhibendi paramenta pro Missae sacrificio sacrisque functionibus prisca concinnata forma, Sacra haec Rituum Congregatio prudenti Ordinariorum iudicio remittendum esse censuit utrum, attentis peculiaribus rerum locorumque adiunctis, ea paramenta permitti possint, necne. Curent tamen locorum Ordinarii in hoc iudicio ferendo, ut sanctitati et decori divini cultus quam maxime prospiciatur, neque sinant a probata disciplina circa sacrarum vestium formam temere atque inconsulte recedi, immo omni cura eas mutationes prohibere, quae perturbationes producere et fidelium animos in admirationem inducere possint.

Romae, die 20 Augusti 1957.

C. Card. CICOGNANI, *Praefectus*

L. ✕ S.

† A. Carinci, Archiep. Seleuc., *a Secretis*

RE-ADMISSION OF EX-SEMINARISTS
 S. CONGREGATIO DE SEMINARIIS ET
 STUDIORUM UNIVERSITATIBUS

DECRETUM

DE RATIONE QUA DIMISSI E SEMINARIIS DENUO ADMITTI POSSINT (*A.A.S.*, 1957, XLIX, p. 640).

Sollemne habet Mater Ecclesia candidatos ad Sacerdotium maxima cura esse explorandos, ut digni habilesque Sacris Ordinibus augeantur, indigni vero ineptique arceantur. Quapropter, ab admit-

tendis in Seminarium alumnis, qui e cuiuscumque Dioecesis Seminario ipsi sua sponte exierint vel a Superioribus quavis de causa dimissi fuerint, generatim abstineant Episcopi; quodsi, omnibus diligenter perpensis, aliquem censeant admittendum, firmo praescripto can. 1363 §3 C. J. C., adeant insuper Sacram Congregationem de Seminariis et studiorum Universitatibus huiusmodi auctoritatem rogaturi, quo uberius de candidati aptitudine constare queat.

Quae omnia Ssmus D. N. Pius Div. Prov. Papa XII approbare atque confirmare dignatus est atque publici iuris fieri mandavit.

Datum Romae, ex Aedibus Sancti Callisti d. 12 Iulii a. D. 1957.

✠. I. Card. PIZZARDO, Ep. Albanen., *Praefectus*

L. ✠ S.

† C. Confalonieri, Archiep. Nicopolitan., *a Secretis*

MATRIMONIAL NULLITY CASES DURING 1956

SACRA ROMANA ROTA

(*A.A.S.*, 1957, XLIX, pp. 663-89)

PLEA	VERDICT	
	<i>Constat de Nullitate</i>	<i>Non Constat de Nullitate</i>
Vis vel metus	43	32 ¹
Vis vel metus; exclusio boni sacramenti	2	1
Vis vel metus; exclusio boni fidei et boni sacramenti	1	—
Vis vel metus; exclusio boni fidei et boni prolis	—	1
Vis vel metus; exclusio boni sacramenti et boni prolis	—	1
Vis vel metus; exclusio boni prolis ...	3	6
Vis vel metus; exclusio boni prolis; conditio apposita	—	1
Vis vel metus; exclusio boni fidei; simulatio totalis	—	1
Vis vel metus; exclusio boni prolis; simulatio totalis	1	1

¹ Dispensation super rato non consummato recommended in the one case in which sought.

PLEA	VERDICT	
	<i>Constat de Nullitate</i>	<i>Non Constat de Nullitate</i>
Vis vel metus; exclusio boni prolis; simulatio consensus	—	1
Vis vel metus; simulatio totalis	1	—
Vis vel metus; simulatio consensus	3	3 ¹
Vis vel metus; defectus consensus	1	1
Vis vel metus; defectus formae	—	1
Vis vel metus; defectus discretionis	1	—
Vis vel metus; ignorantia in muliere naturae matrimonii	—	1
Vis vel metus; impedimentum aetatis; defectus discretionis; impedimentum publicae honestatis	—	1
Exclusio boni prolis	18	22 ²
Exclusio boni fidei	—	1
Exclusio boni sacramenti	5	14
Exclusio boni fidei et boni sacramenti	1	—
Exclusio boni sacramenti et boni prolis	5	3
Exclusio boni prolis; simulatio totalis	2	1
Exclusio boni prolis; impotentia viri	1	1 ³
Exclusio boni prolis; vis vel metus; impotentia viri	—	1 ³
Exclusio boni fidei et boni prolis; defectus consensus; impotentia viri	—	1
Simulatio totalis	1	—
Simulatio totalis; exclusio boni sacramenti	—	1
Simulatio totalis; exclusio boni sacramenti et boni prolis	—	1 ³
Simulatio consensus	3	—
Simulatio consensus; exclusio boni sacra- menti	1	—
Simulatio consensus; exclusio boni fidei et boni sacramenti	—	1
Simulatio consensus; exclusio boni sacra- menti et boni prolis	—	2
Simulatio consensus; conditio appositae	1	1
Conditio appositae	1	3

¹ In one further case, verdict not yet published.

² Dispensation super rato non consummato recommended in the two cases in which sought.

³ Dispensation super rato non consummato not recommended.

PLEA	VERDICT	
	Constat de Nullitate	Non Constat de Nullitate
Conditio appositā; vis vel metus ...	2	—
Conditio appositā; exclusio boni prolis ...	1	—
Conditio appositā; error personae ...	—	1
Impotentia viri	6	22 ¹
Impotentia viri; conditio appositā ...	—	1
Impotentia viri; ignorantia naturae matri- monij	—	1
Impotentia mulieris	—	2 ²
Amentia viri	1	—
Amentia mulieris	4	1
Amentia mulieris; vis vel metus ...	—	2
Defectus formae	3	3
Defectus consensus	1	1
Defectus consensus; exclusio boni prolis	1	—
Defectus consensus; defectus usus rationis et debitae discretionis	—	1
Simulatio consensus; exclusio boni sacra- menti; disparitas cultus; error quali- tatis	—	1
Invalida dispensatio ab impedimento consanguinitatis	—	1
Impedimentum raptus	1	—
<i>Total</i>	115	142

BOOK REVIEWS

Catholic Sermons of Cardinal Newman. Published for the first time, from the Cardinal's autograph manuscripts. Edited at the Birmingham Oratory. (Burns Oates, 1957. 10s. 6d.)

THE publication of a manuscript of Newman for the first time is always an event, more so today, perhaps, than ever before. When the news first leaked out that large numbers of unpublished manuscript sermons still existed in the Oratory archives, it gave rise to a

¹ Dispensation super rato non consummato recommended in fifteen cases, not recommended in four cases in which sought.

² Dispensation super rato non consummato recommended in the one case in which sought.

nine days' wonder in the popular Press. The greater part of these sermons date from Newman's Anglican days. These are less interesting than the published ones: for they are those which Newman had rejected when making his own selections for the Press. There remain nine unpublished Catholic sermons, which are now published in this volume. The reason for the smallness of the number was Newman's early adoption of the Catholic practice of preaching without manuscript.

The first seven sermons of this collection date from soon after Newman's conversion and ordination. They were preached at St Chad's, and Newman walked the six miles from Maryvale each week-end to deliver them. The last sermon has special interest, for it was preached to the seminarists of the diocese of Birmingham on the occasion of the opening of their seminary at Olton.

As Fr Stephen Dessain has pointed out in his masterly few words of introduction, the style of these sermons is nearer to the simplicity and severity of the Anglican sermons than to the ornament and elaboration of the hitherto published Catholic sermons. Though on the whole they must be admitted inferior to the sermons Newman published, their style is worthy of their author, and there are many memorable passages.

The message of these sermons is as Newmantic as we should expect. Often enough, as in the Oxford sermons or in the Sermons to Mixed Congregations, he labours to recall us from the worldliness of our age to the simple truths of the gospels. He is not afraid to appeal to God's almighty power as the basis of our faith and trust. "At least imitate the Apostles in their weakness, if you can't imitate them in their strength." The Apostles may not have had great courage, but they had enough faith to cry out to our Lord for help. "If you can't act as saints, at least act as Christians."

Newman insists all the more on Providence, in that he knows the modern world trusts God too little to believe in it. "All of us, Catholics or not, are led forward by God in a wonderful way—through a way of wonders, a way wonderful to us, a way, marvellous, strange, startling, to our natural feelings and tastes, whatever our place in the Church may be."

The reader of Newman will not be surprised that he touches in these sermons on the Last Judgement and the seriousness of our present state of preparation, the need for approaching God's call with the right dispositions, and the need for resisting the present-day laxity of secular thought. He warns us of the special dangers of the age of journalism. "What strange, diseased curiosity is sometimes felt about the history of murders, and of the malefactors them-

selves! Worse still, it is shocking to say, but there is so much evil curiosity to know about deeds of darkness, of which the Apostle says that it is shameful to speak."

Fr Dessain is surely right to regard the sermon preached to the Olton Church students as the most important. Newman shows himself there prophetically aware of the imminent threat, first of modernism, and then of various forms of infidelity and secularism. He points out to the future priests of the Birmingham diocese that they will have to live among people who, for the first time in the history of the world, know no religion, and live without God. He also warns them that they can no longer count on the wholehearted support of Protestants in protection of basic Christian truths. His counsel to them is to develop a spirit of recollectness and a sense of God's presence, and, above all, a deep knowledge of Catholic theology.

Newman's vocation, as he understood it, was to be a prophet to the modern age, above all to its intellectuals, of the plain truths of the Gospel. Christianity must always differ from the world. "How are we to secure and perpetuate in this world that gift from above? How are we to preserve to the Christian people this gift, so special, so divine, so easily hid or lost amid the imposing falsehood with which the world abounds?" This is the problem of the Catholic priesthood.

The Political Thought of John Henry Newman. By Terence Kenny. Pp. 208. (Longmans, 1957. 21s.)

MR KENNY has succeeded in producing yet another entirely new type of Newman book. The importance of Newman's political thought has not been entirely overlooked. It has notably been stressed by Professor Brinton and Professor Laski. Anyone acquainted with Newman's life is not really surprised that Mr Kenny has found so much material, and of such interest. Was it not James Anthony Froude who said of Newman: "Nothing was too large for him, nothing too trivial, if it threw light upon the central question, what man really was and what was his destiny. . . . Newman had read omnivorously; he had studied modern thought and modern life in all its forms, and with all its many-coloured passions. . . . He spoke to us . . . about subjects of the day, of literature, of public persons and incidents, of everything which was generally interesting." The Newman here described must clearly have had a great deal to say on politics. Mr Kenny has searched through Newman's works widely "for scattered arguments and reflexions", examined "letters and conversations in print" and many unpublished papers. Naturally he has not succeeded in discovering that Newman was as interested

in political matters as he was in religious and educational ones. But Newman was too much of a realist to think he could support an interest in either of the latter subjects without a deep concern in political affairs.

Mr Kenny confirms the common view that Newman was always a conservative. But he shows the grave fallacy that would conclude that he was always a Tory. He did go through a Tory phase, but came to realize it was "as a political phenomenon . . . a thing of the past. It was an object of the imagination, and therefore a principle of barbarism, while the principle of the civilized State must be an object of sense". So Newman remained a conservative in his profound conviction of the order and harmony of the Universe and his belief that the State, as the individual, was part of that order. He was filled with a sense of law, gained from a world permeated by law. Even his theory of development was based on a deep conservatism.

But, unexpectedly perhaps to many, Mr Kenny insists that, without surrendering his basic conservatism, Newman moved over from Toryism to political liberalism. Mr Kenny is not a little worried by Newman's own statement at the end of his life that he has always fought liberalism. He rightly judges that part of Newman's opposition to various forms of liberalism was his rejection of a certain imbecile optimism about man's capability of moral progress by means of education and reform. Newman had too vivid a sense of the harm done to man by original sin to be optimistic of any change of heart except under the influence of religion and grace. Newman was also very critical of Benthamism and all types of Utilitarianism. His opposition to such types of liberalism was of course connected with his generally expressed anti-liberalism. But there can be no question that the kind of liberalism which was the real enemy was what at one time was called latitudinarianism. This was in matters of religion; and amounted to the denial of revelation. It either refused to believe that God has spoken; or, admitting that God has spoken, refused to agree that man was bound to listen and, having listened, to believe. Newman's opposition to the over-optimism of the followers of the Brougham school was really closely associated with this anti-latitudinarianism. He suspected rightly that those who sought to substitute education for religion were basically out of harmony with the religion of Incarnation and the Supernatural.

The kinds of liberalism which were not in principle opposed to dogma and the supernatural won more and more sympathy from Newman during the course of his life, as Mr Kenny is able clearly to show. He ended by being clearly on the side of liberal Catholicism, as far as religious politics are concerned. Yet he was always a

cautious liberal. Frequently he found himself having to fight on two fronts, both against the Tories or extreme Ultramontanes and against liberals of the Acton type. In the field of pure education, he was able to be uncompromisingly liberal, and feel quite confident that in doing so he was being profoundly conservative. For his liberal humanism looked back to the ancient Hellenistic tradition for its basic educational principles.

Mr Kenny's book is full of inspiring suggestions. Most important, for instance, in understanding Newman is the statement that he had a deep sense of continuity. "The development of ideas was an eminently social process, which involved a partnership of the living and the dead, and to which those yet unborn would be able to make their specific contribution." What a penetrating expression for a most essential aspect of all Newman's thought!

I still feel, after reading this book that Mr Kenny makes too much of Newman's insistence that it is impossible to discover among the States of history a perfectly just government. This is more a theological than a political statement. But, in Newman's mind, it should not prevent us striving to attain justice.

I would like to make a suggestion on a small point that appears to puzzle Mr Kenny. Newman distinguishes civilized states as tending to substitute objects of sense for objects of the imagination as the basis of their existence. He mentions as objects of sense "internal peace, and protection of life and property, and freedom of the individual". Mr Kenny is puzzled as to how these can be classed as objects of sense experience. Does not Newman here take the word "sense" in its intellectual meaning, as he does when he speaks of "illative sense", and as we all do when we speak of "common sense". There seem to be many cases in Newman Language where he unexpectedly uses "sense" for an aspect of our intellectual perception.

It will be seen that Mr Kenny's book will stimulate great interest both among Newman students and among students of politics.

H. FRANCIS DAVIS

Catholic Pioneers in West Africa. By Martin J. Bane, S.M.A. Pp. 220. (Clonmore & Reynolds Ltd., Dublin; Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd., London. 18s.)

THIS is a Mission book with a difference. Crammed with historical data, names of missionaries, native kings and chiefs, colonial administrators, etc., it is not easy to read and to be enjoyed. An immense amount of research has gone into the writing of this encyclopædic accumulation of facts and data, which for reference

purposes have been made readily accessible by a lengthy alphabetical name-index. As a narrative the book provides an interesting insight into the relentless efforts of the Church to evangelize West Africa. As the story unfolds itself from the very earliest efforts at colonization and Christianization in 1291 by two Genoese ships with two Franciscan friars on board, we meet one surprise after another, especially when the Kings of Portugal, under Prince Henry, the fourth son of King John I of Portugal, threw themselves with heart and soul into the exploring and conversion venture of the newly discovered countries. As Grand Master of the Military Order of Christ from 1417 to 1460, Henry may be called the first Superior of a Catholic exclusively missionary organization. Owing to their efforts the Catholic Faith spread its beneficent influence all along the West African coast and even into the Congo in 1490. Mention is made of the often named but vaguely known first black bishop, Prince Henry of the Congo, who was consecrated as coadjutor bishop to the bishop of Finchal. We are inclined to smile when we hear of the diocese of Finchal which comprised all the islands off the African coast, the mainland of Africa, the East Indies and Brazil! Of course this was a pioneering time when extraordinary things did happen: Capuchin missionaries baptizing babies whilst en route to further mission fields, the first negro Capuchin priest in the Congo in 1690, the black king of Warry demanding a European wife as the price for his conversion to the Catholic Faith. But these are the beginnings through which an undulating current of successes and failures runs with painful regularity. It would be an interesting study to pin-point more in detail the reasons for the failures. The slave trade proved no doubt a great obstacle, the suppression of the Jesuit Order in 1773 was a deathblow for mission work in Angola and the Congo, and the bad moral example of Europeans undermined the good work done by the missionaries. But with the nineteenth century, which saw the foundation of the Missionaries of the Immaculate Heart of Mary (later fused with the Holy Ghost Fathers) and of the Society of the African Mission (Mgr Bresillac), a second spring was inaugurated. It is tragic to read of the terrible holocaust of young missionary lives, which fell victim to the West African climate. Missions in Guinea, Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast were established, the interior of Togoland and Nigeria are reconnoitred and a whole string of mission stations along the main routes are opened. All these activities are described in bewildering detail with a galaxy of names of mission pioneers, mission stations, native kings, which makes the reading of this narrative difficult and tiring. One defect should be definitely repaired in the next edition: a good clear map or maps,

to enable the reader to orientate himself when trying to follow the missionary activities of these great "Catholic Pioneers of West Africa", so learnedly reported by Fr M. J. Bane.

China and the Cross. Studies in Missionary History. By Columba Cary-Elwes, O.S.B. Pp. xii + 323. (Longmans, Green & Co. 25s.)

THE tragedy of Communist overrun China has focussed interest and sympathy on the dreadful strangulation process to which the Missions in China are subjected. We hear of the thousands of priests expelled, of the thousands of Christians maltreated and martyred and one begins to long for some more knowledge of how all this came about, for an insight into the historical and religious background of the mission work as a whole in China.

That is exactly what Fr Columba Cary-Elwes provides us in his admirable book *China and the Cross*. The whole history of mission work in China is narrated, beginning with a discussion of the legend of the coming of St Thomas the Apostle to China, which legend is dismissed as not proven. The real mission history begins with a description of the Nestorian Mission in China in the seventh century; its methods and successes will come as a surprise to many readers. The resulting watered down Christianity was all that was found by the first European missionary, the Franciscan John de Montecorvino, when he entered China in 1292. His mission adventure had been stimulated by the arrival in Rome in 1287 of a Chinese Nestorian monk, Rabban Sauma, who became reconciled with the Catholic Church and submitted himself to the Holy See. Time and again Franciscan caravans set out in the course of the fourteenth century, but they did not succeed in securing a permanent footing for the Church in China. The last group of Franciscans who landed in 1579 in Canton were glad to be able to return to the Philippines alive. When the Jesuit Matteo Ricci arrived in 1590 in China, it seems that not a trace of the Franciscan missions was left. In 1585 the Holy See granted to the Jesuits the exclusive right of evangelizing China. The slow rise to eminence in the Chinese world of letters by Matteo Ricci on account of his geographical and mathematical abilities was instrumental in establishing the Church among the intellectual classes, so that at Ricci's death the Church in China counted about 2000 Catholics. A period of peaceful progress now commenced. Many were the converts who entered the Church and about ninety "literati" were preparing for the priesthood. Since Latin appeared to offer insurmountable difficulties for these men, who were all men well advanced in years, permission was sought

from the Holy See to allow them to use the Chinese language for their Holy Office and Mass. This gave rise to the famous dispute about the Chinese Rites, which we find fully discussed by Fr Cary-Elwes. It seems to me that on this question a bias in favour of the Jesuits is discernible in this book, whilst the counter-arguments of the Dominicans and Franciscans are not given their full value. But this is only a slight defect.

The story develops the consolidation of the mission work by the many outstanding men who joined the China mission such as Rhodes, Pallu, de la Motte, Verbiest, Schall, the Society for the Foreign Missions of Paris, the Lazarists. The political game between Portugal and Spain and their importance and influence on the missions is placed in proper perspective. The suppression in 1773 of the Society of Jesus in Europe had its fatal repercussions on the Chinese Missions. Persecutions broke out, encouraged by civil war and undue European interference for the sake of trade alliances. Also the Protestant Missions became more active in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, embarrassing by their multitudes of sects the bewildered ignorant Chinese. Especially their activity in the use of the printed word and in the educational and medical fields demanded from the Catholic missionaries a straining of all their resources to counteract the opposing Protestant influences, handicapped as the Catholics were by lack of finances. The Boxer Risings caused another setback. But in the twentieth century China found in Fr Vincent Lebbe the apostle of the moment, who stimulated the promotion of a Chinese clergy and Hierarchy, which proved a providential inspiration, when the Communist upheaval attacked the Church in China and for all practical appearances strangled the Church in China.

The book ends on a tragic note of the Church's agony in Communist China, but with the encouraging flash-back that such has been the fate of the Church in China as all over the world: *Luctor et emergo*. It is a splendid book, indeed; warmly recommended as a balanced, erudite and most interesting study of the mission work in China.

Mission to Cathay. The Biography of Blessed Odoric of Pordenone. By Rev. Anselm M. Romb, O.F.M., Conv. Pp. 163. (St Anthony Guild Press, 508 Marshall Street, Paterson, New Jersey, U.S.A., 1956. \$2.50.)

THE story of Blessed Odoric's travels and labours, which is offered to us in this book, is based mainly on Odoric's autobiography. As could be expected, the observations and descriptions are often delightfully naïve in their mediaeval concepts, but they betray a bravery and courage hardly matched by modern antarctic explorers.

The Franciscan monk Odoric left Venice in 1316 and returned there in 1330, having travelled on foot by boat and cart right through Asia Minor, around India to China, where he worked for three years at the court of the Great Khan. The title of the book indicates that this is primarily a travel book and only secondarily a biography. Hence we are treated generously to descriptions of men and things as the keen-eyed Odoric observed them, but the mission methods employed, the successes and failures of the missionary work in Cathay find little place in the work. We are treated on interesting experiences and customs in the various countries through which Blessed Odoric passed and of far-away China centuries before Ricci or St Francis Xavier came there. We meet Friar John of Monte Corvino, Bishop of Cathay in 1305, tirelessly working for the conversion of the Tartars, translating the whole of the New Testament and the Psalter into the Tartar language, and even celebrating Mass in the Tartar language. And what mission student would not be interested to hear more about Prester John, one of whose descendants, the Nestorian King George, was promoted to minor Orders although he was married, by John of Monte Corvino? It is the "liberty of the children of God" which we find displayed in this simple and unadorned narrative, now and again repetitive in style but without an overdose of pompous scholarship, thus making it an ideal and instructive book for the average reader.

Martyrs in China. By Jean Monsterleet, S.J. Pp. 288. (Longmans, Green & Co. London. 15s.)

COMMUNISM has appeared to us under various guises: in the early twenties in Russia as a ruthless, cruel outburst of a suppressed people against despotic Tsarism, in the middle thirties in Spain as an uncontrollable fury of fratricide, and now in China as a satanic systematic raid into the innermost sanctuary of the human soul. This book *Martyrs in China* paints a picture of such sadistic cruelties, of such clever psychological draining of all that is noble and human in man, that all the tortures of a Diocletian persecution, French Revolution and Elizabethan cruelties are dwarfed into child's play by it. On the other hand, the noble, superhuman courage displayed by clergy and laity in China are an inspiration and encouragement for us who enjoy the happiness of serving God in liberty. Fr Monsterleet's book is a modern Martyrology full of enlightening and encouraging examples of heroism and unbounded charity. But it is more. It shows how with the elimination of the clergy the role of the Catholic laity assumes an ever greater importance. With the murdering, imprisonment or expulsion of bishops and priests, the Church

in China threatens to become an acephalous Church. The purity of the teaching of doctrine, the maintenance of high moral standards, the administration of some sacraments devolves more and more on the laity. But how long will they be able to resist the psychological onslaught of Communism? And when those who have resisted have died, will the younger generation, which grew up in this Communistic atmosphere, were educated in Communist-run schools, still be able to carry on the apostolate of the Church untarnished and unaltered, deprived as they are of good instruction and of the help of grace of the sacraments? The persecution, as described in this book, is so cleverly conducted that after a couple of years the Church will have been driven underground completely so that an outward manifestation of its doctrine or discipline will no longer be possible. In Chapter VI of the book the author describes how the attack on the mind reduces the strongest characters to drivelling automata, putting their signature to the most atrocious crimes, such as the murdering of babies, spying for foreign governments, etc. In a word, this book gives us an insight in the terrible process of the violent conversion of a naturally good, peace-loving nation into an atheistic, communistic army. It is a sad story but also an epic of magnificent heroism and courage. The heart-stirring picture of the glorious stand the Catholics of Shanghai made against the Communistic attack is one of the finest examples of Catholic solidarity in the Church's history. Or the description of the heroic martyrdom of Bishops Ford and Jarr or of Fr Leonides Bruns, O.F.M., who was literally torn to pieces, the great role played by the Legion of Mary, the secret administration of the sacraments, the story of little Mei, a girl of three years, who went round in prison distributing Holy Communion, these are all little incidences described in the book which make one feel inclined rather to end the book with a *Te Deum* than with a *Miserere*.

The book deserves to be widely spread and read not merely for the very instructive insight it gives in the persecution of the Church in China, but also for the clear analysis of the Communistic pattern of policy in its efforts to suppress the Church.

J. DE REEPER

Handy Andy and the Wee House. By Ruth Duffin. Illustrated by E. S. Duffin. (Browne & Nolan. 6s.)

A VERY good book for children of five years old upwards. It is a charming tale, in good clear print, pleasantly illustrated in black and white with a coloured frontispiece. Some children discover that they can build a cottage for a destitute old woman in whom they are

interested by doing kind acts. Bit by bit the walls rise (on one sad occasion they fall again because of quarrelsome behaviour) until they proudly present the finished house and garden to their old friend.

M. T.

CORRESPONDENCE

LATIN FOR CHURCH STUDENTS

(THE CLERGY REVIEW, September 1957, pp. 574 ff.)

Rev. A. J. McIver writes:

When Alice met the mouse in Wonderland she addressed it "O mouse." She thought this must be correct, as she had seen in her brother's Latin Grammar "O table." A boy's first introduction to Latin may be somewhat forbidding if the teacher does not use some imagination. To a Catholic boy it comes more natural to learn the Latin for "Holy Mary, pray for us" than for "O consul, summon a lictor". Whatever approach is adopted, he will need to learn a great deal of grammar and syntax. Modern textbooks will introduce him to the difficulties gradually, but we could do with more books, such as *Legendo*, to keep the young Catholic student on fairly familiar ground, instead of plunging him at once into the strange surrounding of pagan Rome.

But when our student is ready for more consecutive reading of Latin authors, we must decide what he is to read. Correspondence in THE CLERGY REVIEW has suggested that there should be much more emphasis on "Church Latin", or even that classical Latin should be dropped entirely. There are some obvious practical difficulties about this. Nearly all our school books assume classical Latin as the norm, and it would take time and much hard work to produce school editions of the Fathers and other ecclesiastical writers. Again, public examinations require proficiency in the Classics if a candidate is to pass in Latin. Our Church students necessarily spend a good many hours of their school life in studying Latin, and it will be hard on a boy who later decides that he is not called to the priesthood, or who wants to matriculate at a university (whether as cleric or layman), if he has no academic qualifications to show for all his work.

Much more important, however, is the question of the educational value of the Classics. Our older schools have a strong classical

tradition, which it would be wanted to abandon in pursuit of mere technical "efficiency". Surely there is no need to labour this point. The culture which produced the classical literature is also the background to much of the New Testament, to the Fathers, to many elements in the literature and art of Europe in mediaeval and modern times. If we are to have a really educated clergy, nothing else can quite replace some first-hand knowledge of the ancient Classics. It is true that most Church students are not likely to reach a high standard, or to retain much detailed knowledge of the Classics after their schooldays, but the same applied to much else that is learnt at school.

On the other hand, there seems no obvious reason why ecclesiastical writers should not be read along with the pagan Classics. There is no more difference between "Church Latin" and "classical Latin" than between classical prose and verse. If passages from the Vulgate or from St Bede's *Ecclesiastical History* are being read by boys who are using the ordinary classical textbooks, the master may sometimes think it well to call attention to differences in construction or vocabulary, and explain that for purposes of Latin composition the conventional classical usage is to be followed. But this does not brand Church Latin as in any way inferior. We do not teach our young scholars to regard Virgil and Horace as inferior to Cicero and Caesar because the poets use words and constructions which are not used in classical prose. It might be added that our Church students will need to be conversant with classical vocabulary and syntax if they are to understand modern textbooks of Philosophy and Theology, papal encyclicals and other official documents, not to mention many of the writings of the Fathers.

No doubt our school timetables are in danger of being overcrowded. So many branches of study are important in preparing the future priest for his work in the world today. For young men who begin the study of Latin after the normal age, or for students in some of our new schools where there is no classical tradition and perhaps a shortage of masters qualified to teach classical Latin, it may be inevitable that a merely utilitarian system of teaching the necessary minimum of Latin is adopted. But let us not be precipitate in discarding a valuable feature of our long-standing tradition in education.

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